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Abstract 
 I 
Abstract 
Scarcity of oil and increasing demand make the crude price continue to climb, 
and such pressure urges our effort to reduce the reliance on oil products. As a major 
consumer of oil synthetic fuels, the transportation sector needs to take a big step in 
energy conservation. To inform policy makers of costs and benefits in the future of 
decisions made now, this paper develops a system dynamic model to explore the role 
of gasoline taxation in the process of fuel economy technology development and 
adoption. 
The model focuses mostly on the interplay of gasoline price change, car 
consumer choices and automakers technology investment decisions. It is built and 
simulated in the context of China and its growing private passenger car market. 
Gasoline tax, tax refund, technology development subsidy are tested and compared.  
When the gasoline price increases, the sooner we impose the gasoline tax, the 
better. Even though we face a cost increase right after the tax imposition, we can 
enjoy a much lower cost later and cover the cost increase before. Taking the tax as 
subsidy for technology development of fuel economy, a much better benefit can be 
enjoyed. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
Two centuries ago, the first industrial revolution made people a hundred times 
more productive, harnessed fossil energy for transport and production and nurtured 
the world economy (Lovins et al. 2004). While still enjoying all the benefits from oil 
employment, we have to admit the problem - Oil is the lifeblood for modern industrial 
economies, but not forever. 
The scarcity of crude oil and increasing demand has driven the price to $75.35 
per barrel, a record high on April 21, 2006. Crude oil imports into the world's second 
biggest consumer, China, rose 3.5 percent in 2005 and 34.8 percent in 2004, 
according to customs data. Crude imports may reach 160 million tons (about 3.2 
million barrels a day) from last year's 145 million tons, China Petrochemical Corp., 
the nation's largest oil refiner, said in its online newsletter in March. China's oil 
imports may rise 10 percent this year, a slower pace than last year's 14 percent, as 
government policies to boost energy conservation cuts fuel consumption. (Bloomberg 
2007) 
As oil supplies are becoming more concentrated and less secure, the more we 
depend on oil, the more vulnerable our economy will be. To reduce our reliance on 
petroleum products, we can turn to energy conservation, which is the practice of 
decreasing the quantity of energy used while achieving a similar outcome of end use.  
Over the next twenty years, transportation is expected to be the major driving 
force behind a growing world demand for energy. It is the largest end-use of energy in 
developed countries and the fastest growing one in most developing countries. The 
transport sector represents nearly 30 percent of total emissions of carbon dioxide, the 
primary contaminant responsible for global climate change. Further, with rapid 
growth in motor vehicle use in the developing world, the sector is also the fastest 
growing source of greenhouse gas emissions (Economic and Social Council, U. N. 
2001). Thus, transportation must play an active part in energy conservation. 
The transportation sector includes all vehicles used for personal or freight 
Chapter 1 Introduction 
 2 
transportation. Of the oil used in this sector around the world, approximately 75% is 
consumed by road vehicles. Air traffic consumes about 12%, sea consumes about 7% 
and train plus river transport consume most of the remaining 6% (Cui 2006).  
In 2004, road traffic contributes 1/3 to the total oil consumption in China. As 
automobiles become more and more popular in China, fuel consumption is expected 
on rise continually. However, the 100-km fuel consumption in China is 10%-15% 
more than that in developed countries (Chinese Academy of Engineering 2003).  
The continual rising gasoline consumption spurred the creation, in 2004, of the 
Passenger Vehicle Fuel Consumption Standard program, which required auto 
manufacturers to meet progressively fleet fuel economy targets according to vehicle 
weight. It targeted to reduce its average 100-km fuel consumption by 5%-10% in 
2006 compared to that in 2000, and by 10% in 2009 compared to that in 2006. The 
next few years saw advocates for economy vehicles and some improvements in fuel 
economy, mostly the result of relaxation of small car limitation in large cities. These 
gains eroded somewhat due to people’s perception of ‘poor-looking’ and ‘poor 
matches of social identity’ for economy cars, which makes automakers prefer to 
improve looks rather than fuel efficiency. 
Since overall average fuel economy on road did not improve as expected, the 
China government comes to realize the market itself is not efficient enough to push 
technology development and adoption in auto industry. The standard itself may lead 
auto manufacturers to take chance meeting the minimum level of fuel economy 
without any further improvement. In addition to extension of fuel consumption 
standard to freight fleet, the government has begun to think about gasoline tax to 
encourage purchase and production of better fuel efficiency vehicles.  
This potential policy has received much attention and much research has been 
done to declare its positive and/or negative effects. Some analysis may only consider 
situations on the end-state of policy implementation, which are too simplistic to 
appreciate the complexity of the entire system and dynamics of technology 
development and adoption. To better understand the dynamics of gasoline tax effect, a 
systematic approach is needed. 
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System Dynamics is a method to enhance learning in complex systems. It helps 
us learn about dynamic complexity, understand the sources of policy resistance, and 
design more effective policies. It is fundamentally interdisciplinary. Because we are 
concerned with the behavior of complex systems, system dynamics is grounded in the 
theory of nonlinear dynamics and feedback control developed in mathematics, physics, 
and engineering (Sterman 2001).  
System Dynamics has been used to analyze energy problems, taxation and auto 
development ever since, but few studies explore the role of gasoline tax in the process 
of fuel economy technology improvement. Given gasoline tax and pressure from high 
gasoline price, consumers may tend to purchase better fuel efficiency car at least for 
the same price range, hence encourage automakers to improve its technology 
development and adoption, reducing the overall fuel economy of cars on road. 
Due to time limitation, a country-specific model will be created on the basis of 
China’s private passenger vehicle market which is the main segment of the 
automobile market and a large consumer of gasoline. These simplifications can be 
relaxed in later research.  
To gain insight of the dynamics, we disaggregate the car stock into seven 
categories according to its price. In each category, we separate them into fuel efficient 
car and non-fuel efficient car with their relative level of average fuel economy in that 
price range. Referring to the relative income hypothesis, households are divided into 
several income classes related to the car price.  
We apply historical data for the years before 2007 and run the model to see why 
the average fuel economy is not improving as expected in the past few years. For the 
years after 2007, we assume three different scenarios – the first one is that the 
gasoline price stays constant after 2007; the second one encounters a step increase to 
double the price in 2015; and the third one follows a linear gradual increase to twice 
of gasoline price from 2007 to 2015. 
Average fuel economy, total gasoline consumption and cost per vehicle 
kilometers (v-km) are the main indexes to analyze the effect of gasoline tax in all the 
scenarios. Different timing of policy implementation, tax refund and technology 
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development subsidy from tax collection are tested and compared. 
The damage from the tax imposition when the gasoline price stays constant since 
2007 is analyzed first. If the gasoline price does not rise at all, the gasoline tax could 
make some damage to car owners, but probably not as much as most of us expect.  
When the gasoline price increases, the sooner we impose the gasoline tax, the 
better. Even though we face a cost increase right after the tax imposition, we can 
enjoy a much lower cost later and cover the cost increase before. Taking the tax as 
subsidy for technology development of fuel economy, a much better benefit can be 
enjoyed. 
This thesis is organized in eight chapters. Chapter 2 summarizes the related 
literature and past work for the problem under study. Chapter 3 states the problem in 
details and Chapter 4 develops the dynamic hypothesis through causal loop diagram. 
Chapter 5 introduces the main structure of system dynamic modeling by stock and 
flow diagram. Following Chapter 6 focuses on the validation of the model by various 
testing methods such as boundary adequacy, structure assessment, dimensional 
consistency, extreme condition test and sensitivity test. Chapter 7 conducts behavior 
analysis and policy design, attempting to understand the dynamics behind the gasoline 
consumption problem and try to analyze the effect of gasoline tax on consumers’ and 
automakers’ behavior. The last Chapter 8 concludes the major findings and results of 
the current study, and points out its limitation and necessary future work. 
Chapter 2 Literature Review 
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Chapter 2 Literature Review 
Time-series analysis and cross-sectional analysis are probably two popular ways 
to analyze the causal relationships. Time-series analysis examines variables over time, 
such as the effects of population growth on a nation’s GDP. Cross-sectional analysis 
examines the relationship between different variables at a point in time; for instance, 
the relationship between individuals’ income and food expenditures.  
A strong tendency in these studies is to correlate factors in light of the historical 
data, neglecting the feedback loops among them. Such simplistic attributions fail to 
consider the entire system and do not appreciate the complexity of system. 
Additionally, some may only consider the end states, with little consideration given to 
the dynamics that would lead to realizing these end states. 
System Dynamics is an approach to understand the behavior of complex systems 
over time. It deals with internal feedback loops and time delays that affect the 
behavior of the entire system. The use of feedback loops and stocks & flows help 
describe how even seemingly simple systems display baffling nonlinearity and that 
makes System Dynamics stands out from the other approaches dealing with complex 
systems. 
System dynamics modeling has been used for strategic energy planning and 
policy analysis for more than twenty-five years. The story begins with the WORLD 
modeling projects conducted in the early 1970s by the System Dynamics Group at the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 
One of the central assumptions underlying the WORLD models is that the earth’s 
natural resources are, at some level, finite and that the exponential growth in their use 
could ultimately lead to their depletion and hence, to limit global population and 
economic growth (F. Naill, 1992).  
The finite resources assumption, put forth by petroleum geologist M. King 
Hubbert (1949), tells that the life cycle of oil and gas discovery and production yields 
a bell-shaped production curve. That curve describes “a period of low resource price 
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and exponential growth in production, a peaking of production as the effects of 
resource depletion cause discoveries per foot of exploratory drilling to drop and 
resource price to rise, in addition to a long period of rising costs and declining 
production as the substitution to alternative resources proceeds”. 
Worried about problems suggested in the Limits to Growth (Meadow et al. 1972) 
from the dependence on oil, the National Science Foundation of the United States 
asked the Resource Policy Group at Dartmouth College to study the United States’ 
“energy transition problem”. One of the results from using FOSSIL1 to analyze the 
energy transition questions was that: Smoothly passing through the energy transition 
requires policies that both stabilize energy demand and increase alternative energy 
supplies.  
During his work to modify and extend the FOSSIL1 model into the FOSSIL2 
model, John Sterman realized that the FOSSIL2 model ignored important feedbacks 
and interactions between the energy sector of the economy and the economy itself. 
For his Ph.D. dissertation, Sterman built a system dynamics energy model that 
captured, for the first time, significant energy-economy interactions. The model 
pointed out the following conclusions: As OPEC prices rise, the costs of producing 
synthetic fuels and other alternative sources rise, adding to inflationary pressures. The 
economy is likely to face a prolonged period of economic vulnerability due to 
continuing depletion of nonrenewable resources, slow development of alternative 
sources, and lags in the adjustment of energy consumption to higher prices (Sterman 
1981).  
Later on, Fiddaman (1997) created a new climate-economy system dynamics 
model called FREE (Feedback-Rich Energy Economy model). The FREE model 
explicitly incorporates the dynamics of oil and gas depletion as a “source constraint” 
on the energy-economy system (as do all of its system dynamics predecessors), as 
well as the dynamics of a “sink constraint” (i.e., climate change) on the 
energy-economy system. 
Pressure from human induced climate-change and fossil fuel limitation urge the 
process of energy conservation and energy transition. Due to the close relationship 
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between the automotive and energy industry, gasoline conservation is now at the top 
of the agenda.  
The M3 model, a Millennium Institute and General Motors collaboration, is a 
system dynamics model for analysis of vehicle markets in emerging markets 
(Weishuang Qu et al. 2003). It emphasizes the interconnectedness of the economy, 
demographics, the vehicle market, regulatory policies, infrastructure, energy demands, 
emissions, congestion, international trade, and other factors. However, the 
representation of fuel efficiency and technology investment is not fully developed in 
the current M3 model. 
The government can influence the behavior of automakers through regulation, tax 
and subsidy, but its role in the gasoline conservation is under discussion. This paper is 
going to explore the effect of government’s gasoline taxation policy, aiming to prompt 
manufactures to develop and adopt technology, improve fuel economy, reduce total 
gasoline consumption while reducing or maintaining consumer cost per vehicle 
kilometers. We aggregate all kinds of auto manufactures into one big party, ignoring 
competitions inside the auto industry. 
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Chapter 3 Problem Statement 
Gasoline conservation is forced by a shortage or depletion of oil resources. As the 
transportation sector is the major consumer of oil products, its energy conservation 
receives the most attention. However, while it offers many long-term socio-economic 
advantages, there is not enough incentive for manufactures to invest more on 
technology and develop better fuel-efficient cars. It may be difficult for car owners 
and automakers to justify investment in some gasoline saving measures. Financial 
payback versus energy savings argument is always made. 
The increase in purchasing power in China has led to a growing demand for 
quality transportation services and more convenient and flexible transportation 
systems. Use of private cars is often the preferred choice of wealthy people and the 
middle class. Increase in the use of private vehicles is largely the result of government 
policy to promote economic development through automobile sector growth and 
infrastructure development. It puts emphasis on the increased private car ownership as 
means of stimulating personal consumption for economic growth (Gan 2003).  
Rapid development of private passenger car ownership in China has had 
considerable impacts on energy use by increasing the pressure on oil production, 
distribution and consumption as the country becomes increasingly dependent on 
imported oil to sustain its growing demands. Market competition has always been a 
major driving force behind improving the energy efficiency of newly made cars. 
However, in terms of fuel economy, cars in China consume somewhat 10%-15% more 
energy than those products in developed countries. 
Realizing the inefficiency of market, the China government imposed a stricter 
fuel economy regulation for passenger cars in 2004, aiming to improve fuel efficiency 
of cars on the market and product line. Unfortunately, we did not see further 
improvement except automakers narrowly meeting the fuel economy standard, 
reluctant to do things better. The average fuel economy on road is still unexpectedly 
increasing. According to this, we draw our reference mode for the problem below. 
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Figure 3-1 Problem Reference Mode 
What’s more, the market saw advocates for economy cars but few really take 
actions. Some may attribute this to people’s preference for bigger cars with increasing 
buying power. The rising gasoline price urges consumers to concern about fuel 
economy. People are hesitant to turn to small or economy cars, which always remind 
them of poor looking, low social status etc. Without the market incentive, namely 
profit, the technology development and adoption in auto industry is very slow. 
The China government is considering some additional policies such as gasoline 
tax besides fuel economy standard extension to freight vehicles. Therefore, 
understanding the dynamics of this problem is helpful when policy makers are making 
decisions. 
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Chapter 4 Dynamic Hypothesis 
Feedback is one of the core concepts of system dynamics. Yet our mental models 
often fail to include the critical feedbacks determining the dynamics of our systems. 
In system dynamics we use several diagramming tools to capture the structure of 
systems, including causal loop diagrams and stock and flow maps. 
Causal loop diagrams (CLDs) are an important tool for representing the feedback 
structure of systems. Long used in academic work, and increasingly common in 
business, CLDs are excellent for 
 Quickly capturing our hypotheses about the causes of dynamics; 
 Eliciting and capturing the mental models of individuals or teams; 
 Communicating the important feedbacks we believe are responsible for a 
problem. 
A causal diagram consists of variables connected by arrows denoting the causal 
influences among variables. The arrows with two lines denote some delays between 
two linked variables. The important feedback loops are also identified in the diagram. 
Each causal link is assigned a polarity, either positive (+) or negative (-) to indicate 
how the dependent variable changes when the independent variable changes. The 
important loops are highlighted by a loop identifier which shows whether the loop is a 
positive (reinforcing) or negative (balancing) feedback. Note that the loop identifier 
circulates in the same direction as the loop to which it corresponds. 
The following Causal Loop Diagram (see Figure 4-1) represents my very basic 
hypothesis of the problem.  
gasoline price
desired fuel efficiency
actual fuel efficiency
gap between desired and
actual fuel efficiency
fuel efficiency
improvement
+
-
+
+
+
B
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When the gasoline price goes up, people will desire higher fuel efficiency - and 
will choose from existing models - thus closing the gap between desired and actual 
efficiency (a balancing loop). Consumers cannot directly change the actual fuel 
efficiency but to make auto manufactures to improve it through market information. 
household income
private car sales
+
gasoline price
propensity to buy fuel efficient
cars for the same price range
market share of fuel
efficient cars
-
technology
investment
revenue +
+
technology
improvement
+
efficient car price
+
fuel efficient car sales
+
+
+
+ expected fuel
efficient car sales
+
fuel economy
improvement
+
indicated profit for
efficient car
indicated efficient car price
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efficient car
+
+
+
indicated cost for
efficient car
+
-
+
R3
R2
B1
B2
<gasoline price>
+
fixed cost
+
+
gasoline
consumption
gasoline expenditure
-
+
+
total cost+
+
-
R1
indicated efficient
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+
+
 
Figure 4-2 Elaborate Hypothesis – CLD 
Reinforcing Loop 1: Effect of gasoline expenditure 
The increase in disposable household income leads to increase in private car sales. 
Among all the cars on the market, some of them are more fuel efficient than the others 
within the same price range. Fuel efficient cars can reduce the fuel consumption to 
reduce gasoline expenditure. With the continual climb in gasoline price, more and 
more consumers tend to buy cars with better fuel efficiency. Seeing this trend on the 
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market, automakers are considering adopting technology to improve its fuel economy 
on the product line. If the profit is large enough, they will begin their process of fuel 
economy improvement. 
Reinforcing Loop 2: Effect of car price on automakers 
On one hand, this adoption entitles a higher markup in car price due to its better 
fuel efficiency than average in the same price range. It will increase their revenue and 
possibly increase their profit, which can be a strong incentive for further fuel 
improvement. 
Balancing Loop 1: Effect of fuel consumption improvement on automakers 
On the other hand, fuel economy development on product line causes product 
transition cost such as retrofit or substitute cost, which may reduce the indicated 
profit. 
If the revenue is larger than the cost, manufactures would apply the technology 
on product line and better fuel efficient cars appear on the market after some delay.  
Reinforcing Loop 3: Technology development 
In addition to production changes, auto manufactures would like to invest more in 
technology development given expanding market share of better fuel efficiency cars 
and increasing revenue. However, technology development and adoption can be seen 
only after some delay time, not immediately after the investment. 
Balancing Loop 2: Effect of car price on consumers 
Nevertheless, as fuel efficient cars charge more than the ‘normal’ cars, 
consumers’ fixed cost increases, making consumers reluctant to buy better fuel 
efficient cars for the same price range. This decreases fuel efficient car sales and make 
automakers hesitant to invest in technology development and adoption. 
 
As we can see, consumers’ cost is determined by fixed cost and variable cost, 
which is mainly car price and gasoline expenditure respectively in our current model. 
The improvement of fuel consumption can reduce the gasoline expenditure and this 
reduction may cover the cost increased by the car price. Thus, the cost is decided by 
the reinforcing loop 1 (R1) and the balancing loop 2 (B2). Whether it would increase 
Chapter 4 Dynamic Hypothesis 
 13 
or decrease is determined by the dominance of the loop. 
Further, auto manufactures’ decisions are largely influenced by consumers’ 
preference and the profit calculation. Interestingly, the profit is also decided by one 
reinforcing loop (R2) and one balancing loop (B2). This means the increasing cost 
does not necessarily lead to decreasing profit given enough revenue from the 
increasing sales. Similarly, the increasing revenue does not necessarily cause 
increasing profit due to more strong effect from increasing cost. The shifting 
dominance can get very different result. 
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Chapter 5 Model Description 
5.1 Model Boundary 
To gain intuition into the gasoline conservation, a quantitative, integrative, 
dynamic model with a suitable boundary and time horizon, and realistic representation 
of decision making by individuals and other key actors is essential. The time horizon 
of the model is from 1995 to 2030, long enough to capture the delayed and indirect 
effects of potential policies. Due to time limitation, only the private passenger 
vehicles in China are considered and it is the main segment of the vehicle market. We 
target the mass market of typical consumers rather than fleets. 
Gasoline consumption is determined by the interplay of several endogenous 
factors, such as consumers’ propensity to buy better fuel efficiency cars, automakers’ 
willingness to improve fuel efficiency in the lab or on the product line, and 
government incentives. 
The model boundary chart summarizes the scope of the model by listing which 
key variables are included endogenously, which are exogenous, and which are 
excluded from the model. 
Table 5-1 Model Boundary Chart for Key Variables 
Endogenous Exogenous Excluded 
Private Car Ownership 
Fuel Economy 
Technology Investment 
Car Price 
Gasoline Consumption 
Purchase Preference 
Investment Preference 
Gasoline Price before Tax 
Tax Rates 
Population 
Disposable Income 
Car Production 
Car Imports and Exports  
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5.2 Major Assumptions 
5.2.1 Relative Income Hypothesis 
Relative Income Hypothesis was developed by James Stemble Duesenberry 
(1949). His analysis is based on two hypotheses. The first hypothesis is with respect 
to the consumption behavior of an individual. It states that the consumption behaviors 
of individuals are interdependent. An individual is not so much concerned with his 
absolute level of consumption as he is with his consumption relative to the rest of the 
population. Thus the percentage of income consumed by an individual depends on his 
percentile position in the income distribution. The second hypothesis states that the 
present consumption is not influenced merely by present levels of absolute and 
relative income, but also by levels of consumption attained in previous period. He 
argues that consumption relations are irreversible over time. It is difficult for a family 
to reduce a level of consumption once attained. The aggregate ratio of consumption to 
income is assumed to depend on the level of present income relative to past peak 
income. 
According to this hypothesis, the disposable income per household is highly 
related to their car purchasing behavior. People in certain income class would like to 
buy cars in certain price range. To make it simple, we assume that the cars people 
buying are priced at the same level of their disposable income per household. That is 
if they have an income of 50,000 to 100,000, then they only buy the car at the price of 
50,000 to 100,000. Once the income becomes 100,001, they can buy the car at the 
higher price level. This assumption sounds too strict to be true in everyday life 
because we may buy the car pricing over 100,000 even we have an income of 80,000, 
while on the other hand we may buy cars under the price of 100,000 even we have the 
disposable income more than that. From this point of view, we may say that the 
population buying cars above their income level and those buying cars below their 
level are equal. Therefore they offset each other and the end effect remains the same 
as was described in the previous text. We may relax this assumption in later research.  
At this point, we divided all the people in seven income classes, i.e. lower than 
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50K, 50K to 100K, 100K to 160K, 160K to 230K, 230K to 300K, 300K to 500K, and 
over 500K, with respect to some car price categorization. 
5.2.2 Multinomial Logit Model 
To describe consumer’s propensity to purchase better fuel efficiency car for the 
same price range and automakers’ willingness to change fuel economy of new cars, 
we apply the multinomial logit model.  
The neoclassical economic theory assumes that each decision-maker is able to 
compare two alternatives a and b in the choice set C using a preference-indifference 
operator ≥. It results that using the preference-indifference operator to make a choice 
is equivalent to assigning a value, called utility, to each alternative, and selecting the 
alternative associated with the highest utility. However, this theory fails to explicitly 
capture some level of uncertainty in human behavior. 
An important characteristic of models dealing with uncertainty is that, instead of 
identifying one alternative as the chosen option, they assign to each alternative 
probability to be chosen. Luce (1959) proposed the choice axiom to characterize a 
choice probability law by models with stochastic decision rules. Random Utility 
Models, based on the deterministic decision rules from neoclassical economic theory, 
capture uncertainty by random variables representing utilities.  
The assumption of the deterministic term is that, the utility of each alternative 
must be a function of the attributes of the alternative itself and of the decision-maker. 
The logit model is derived from the assumption that the error terms of the utility 
functions are independent and identically Gumbel distributed. These models were first 
introduced in the context of binary choice models, where the logistic distribution is 
used to derive the probability. Their generalization to more than two alternatives is 
referred to as multinomial logit models. The derivation of this result is attributed to 
Holman and Marley by Luce and Suppes (1965). It is interesting to note that the 
multinomial logit model can also be derived from the choice axiom defined by Luce 
(1959).  
We give a popular description of this model before we turn to its properties. Take 
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automakers’ choice for example, for the individual investment, the choice is typically 
one or another of the options. The model assumes that the individual auto 
manufacture chooses the most profitable alternative. This is illustrated by the straight 
line in Figure 5-1 below. When the total profit resulting from changing fuel economy 
are higher than the profit without changing fuel economy, new cars with expected fuel 
economy will be produced on the product line, and vice versa. 
The fact that different auto manufactures face different total profits implies that 
the automakers as a whole behave differently from the individual automaker. Not all 
automakers will suddenly shift from current fuel economy to expected fuel economy 
when the profit of expected fuel economy increases slightly above the other. Some of 
the automakers still find current fuel economy to be the more profitable alternative. 
The smooth and curved lines in Figure 5-1 below show how the auto industry is 
gradually changing its fuel economy, given consideration of consumer preference and 
relative profitability. This is a less rigid view of the substitution process than what is 
implied by the popular assertion that change in fuel economy for new car production 
is either competitive or not competitive. 
 
Figure 5-1 Willingness to Change Fuel Economy as a Function of Profit from Current Fuel 
Economy Car and Expected Fuel Economy Car 
The multinomial logit model (MNL) for automakers’ willingness to change fuel 
economy Wi is shown in equation 1: 
Willingness to Change Fuel Economy 
0 
1/3
2/3
1 
Individual Choice 
Industry Choice 
1 Current Profit / Expected Profit 
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The MNL has only one parameter α except for the parameters profits. When 
profits are given, α determines the steepness of the curve in Figure 5-1.When α is at a 
high extreme the function mimics the individual choice. In the MNL the sum of 
willingness always add up to 1. When both of the profits are equal, half of the auto 
manufactures are willing to change fuel economy. If we divide numerator and 
denominator of the logit function by exp (αPi), we see that willingness depends on 
profit differences (Moxnes 1990). 
The reasoning for customers’ propensity to buy better fuel efficiency car for the 
same price range is more or less the same as the above. The propensity relies on the 
cost differences. However, the propensity changes in reverse direction to the total cost 
changes. The higher the cost, the lower percentage of people tends to buy better fuel 
efficiency cars. Consequently, the MNL model for this variable Propensity in equation 
2 changes a little bit from the one expressing Wi, which changes in the same 
directions as total profit changes. 
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5.3 Model Structure 
5.3.1 Stocks and Flows Diagram 
Causal loop diagrams are very useful in many situations. They are well suited to 
represent interdependencies and feedback processes. However, causal loop diagrams 
suffer from a number of limitations and can easily be abused. One of the most 
important limitations of causal diagrams is their inability to capture the stock and flow 
structure of systems. Stocks and flows, along with feedback, are the two central 
concepts of dynamic systems theory. 
Stocks are accumulations. They characterize the state of the system and generate 
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the information upon which decisions and actions are based. Stocks give systems 
inertia and provide them with memory. Stocks create delays by accumulating the 
difference between the inflow to a process and its outflow. By decoupling rates of 
flow, stocks are the source of disequilibrium dynamics in systems. Stocks are altered 
by inflows and outflows. In the following, we use stock and flow map to describe the 
model structure. 
5.3.2 Private Car Ownership 
private car
private car
purchase
private car
scrappage
CAR LIFE TIME
ADJUSTMENT TIME
propensity to purchase fuel efficient
car for the same price range
desired car for different
price classification
total private car
 
Figure 5-2 Structure - Private Car Ownership 
The private car ownership increases by new car purchase and decreases by old car 
scrappage. The private car purchase is determined by the gap of actual and desired 
private car ownership which is divided into seven categories according to disposable 
income per household and car price. The desired private car ownership is the product 
of number of household and desired car per household, a table function from a 
consumer survey. The adjustment time is time for people to collect car information 
and make the buying decisions. Besides the adjustment of the gap, the scrapping car 
adds to the private car purchase as well.  
In each category, the car is named ‘fuel efficient car’ if its fuel economy is better 
than the average in that category, and the other is called ‘non fuel efficient car’ 
relatively. Considering the gasoline price and car price, some people prefer to buy 
‘fuel efficient car’ within their range. Hence, the purchase is further split into two 
parts in each category. 
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5.3.3 Technology Investment 
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Figure 5-3 Structure – Technology Investment 
The total ‘fuel-efficient car’ bought over total car purchase constitutes the fuel 
efficient car market share. This market share has a positive effect on fractional 
technology investment rate. When the market share is increasing, auto manufactures 
would like to invest more in technology in order to improve fuel economy to earn 
more money. Besides, the gasoline price also has a positive effect on technology 
investment. The higher gasoline price drives people to consider more on fuel economy, 
thus automakers have to improve their fuel economy technology to catch up with 
consumers’ needs. 
5.3.4 Fuel Economy Development 
Fuel economy development goes through three different stages, i.e. fuel economy 
of prototype, new cars and cars on road. To make it simple, the fuel economy changes 
are represented by ‘relative fuel economy’, a relative improvement compared to the 
initial fuel economy. So the new fuel economy is the product of initial value and 
relative level. We would explain these three stages separately below. 
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Stage 1: relative fuel economy of prototype 
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Figure 5-4 Structure – Fuel Economy of Prototype 
The money for technology development is allocated to the right place after some 
time. At the beginning, it is much easier to improve fuel economy. As the technology 
level becomes higher and higher, it demands more money than ever to improve just as 
the same little as before. The relative tech cost table represents the relationship 
between relative tech improvement and money requirement. With certain money 
allocated to technology development, we get one and only one indicated relative level 
of fuel economy. 
Delays are pervasive. It takes time to measure and report information. It takes 
time to make decisions. And it takes time for decisions to affect the state of a system. 
The technology development happens some time after the technology investment. 
Here the delay represents the gradual improvement of fuel economy. The negative 
feedback loop here acts to bring the state of the system in line with the indicated state. 
The state of the relative fuel economy of prototype is compared to the indicated state. 
If there is a discrepancy between the indicated and actual state, corrective action is 
initiated to bring the state of the system back in line with the indicated state. 
Moreover, we use a min function to make sure the technology level would not go 
back even if we invest too little. Little money can be used to maintain the routine 
operation in the research and development department. Therefore, the equation for 
fuel economy improvement is as follows: 
Tech improvement = MIN (0, (indicated relative fuel consumption-Relative Fuel 
Economy Of Prototype))/TIME TO DEVELOP TECH 
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Stage 2: relative fuel economy of new car 
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Figure 5-5 Structure – Fuel Economy of New Car 
Considering the long-term gasoline price development and consumers’ desired 
fuel economy, auto manufactures do not necessarily apply the latest technology on the 
product line. Instead, they put more weight on consumers’ desire, because they may 
earn more profit by selling more cars. In terms of liters per 100 kilometers, if the 
desired fuel economy is lower than the technology level, they adopt the technology on 
product line. Otherwise, they keep on producing what consumers need. Thus, we 
know that the fuel economy improvement is highly constrained by consumers demand 
and their gasoline price expectation. 
Stage 3: average fuel economy on road 
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Figure 5-6 Structure – Average Fuel Economy on Road 
Chapter 5 Model Description 
 23 
Provided expected demand for ‘fuel efficient car’ and ‘non-fuel efficient car’ in 
each category, indicated car price and substitute cost, some automakers change their 
fuel economy of new car, some do not. This is expressed in the term of ‘willingness to 
change fuel economy’, a subscript for different car categories. 
The fuel economy of cars on road improves by the inflow of new car with good 
fuel economy and the outflow of old car with poor fuel economy. Average fuel 
economy denotes the overall improvement or deterioration of car fuel economy on 
road, regardless its category. It is a comprehensive index to evaluate the state of 
gasoline consumption for a hundred kilometers per car. 
5.3.5 Cost and Consumption 
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Figure 5-7 Structure – Cost and Gasoline Consumption 
At this point, it must be noted that only main costs – repairs and maintenance cost, 
insurance, annual depreciation, average road maintenance tax and gasoline 
expenditure- are calculated in the model. The gasoline consumption is the product of 
fuel economy and the average vehicle kilometers. Total gasoline consumption here 
sums up separate consumption from different car categories.
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Chapter 6 Model Testing 
6.1 Model Testing Overview 
Many modelers speak of model “validation” or claim to have “verified” a model. 
In fact, validation and verification of models is impossible because all models are 
wrong. All models, mental or formal, are limited, simplified representation of the real 
world. They differ from reality in ways large and small, infinite in number (Sterman 
2000). Instead of seeking a single test of validity models either pass or fail, we try to 
seek multiple points of contact between the model and reality by drawing on many 
sources of data and a wide range of tests. Instead of viewing validation as a testing 
step after a model is completed, we focus the client on the limitations of the model so 
it can be improved and so clients will not misuse it. Tests we are using here include 
boundary adequacy test, structure assessment test, dimensional consistency test, 
parameter assessment test, extreme conditions test and sensitivity analysis test. 
6.2 Boundary Adequacy Test 
Boundary adequacy tests assess the appropriateness of the model boundary for 
the purpose at hand.  
Transportation is the main consumer of synthetic oil product and road transport 
contributes the biggest part to gasoline consumption. However, even in road transport, 
freight traffic and passenger traffic shows very different characteristics in gasoline 
consumption, needless to say private or public ownership. To understand gasoline tax 
effect step by step, in the current model we choose to focus on private passenger car 
market. Private car market is a booming market in China. As people’s buying power is 
stronger and stronger, private car sales continue to rise dramatically. Different from 
fleet, the typical consumers have more freedom to make their decisions. These 
consumers are more easily to be affected by any policy because they have less 
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tolerance than fleet owners who are normally public well-financed company. 
Therefore, it is suitable to limit us to the private car market for the purpose at this 
point. 
Gasoline consumption is determined by car ownership, average vehicle 
kilometers traveled per year and fuel economy of cars. These three key factors are 
endogenous in the model to help understand the complexity of dynamic system. The 
interaction in fuel economy technology development and adoption is captured in the 
model. Interaction between consumers’ purchase preference and automakers’ 
investment preference is included in the model as well. 
To make it simple, it is reasonable for us to exclude car production and import & 
export in the model and make the assumption that the desired private ownership is 
always fulfilled by either way from the supply side. Furthermore, we are not certain 
how the gasoline price will develop even we believe that it is highly likely to increase 
along the way. Hence, gasoline price is used as exogenous variable and changed in 
different scenarios to analyze possible future development in the model. 
In summary, the model has good boundary for our purpose at hand. 
6.3 Structure Assessment Test 
Structure assessment tests ask whether the model is consistent with knowledge of 
the real system relevant to the purpose. It focuses on the level of aggregation, the 
conformance of the model to basic physical realities and the realism of the decision 
rules for the agents. 
A lot of research has revealed that income is the key factor affecting people’s car 
purchasing behavior. Furthermore, the relationship between income and car sales is 
not linear. When people are very poor, they cannot afford any cars. After they reach 
the threshold, say 3000 USD per capita in China, we see a dramatically increase in car 
purchase. However, even we are very rich, the car we need per household is limited, 
probably two or three. So the desired car ownership shows an S-shape growth in the 
model.  
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Moreover, people’s consumption behavior is not only constrained by their income 
but their social status as well. They try to get a car reflecting their status and 
distinguishing them from a lower class. We split urban and rural population to reflect 
the uneven income distribution in these regions. In addition, we linked people’s 
income to car price, and divided them into seven different categories to better capture 
the private car ownership development.  
Apparently, cost and benefit are the driving force behind consumers’ purchase 
behavior and automakers’ technology investment and adoption behavior. From the 
economists’ view, consumers and automakers should be completely rational human 
beings. Given the same benefit, consumer would certainly choose to buy the cheaper 
car – not only cheap in car price but also in its operational cost. Automakers are 
always pursuing more profit. Nevertheless, in reality, people are not rational enough 
as economists expect. They face a lot of different situations and they receive either too 
much or too little information. Even put in front of the same situations, they may 
make different decisions. The multinomial logit model is used in the current model to 
reflect this interesting reality. 
Last but not the least; we have considered the delays in people’s perception, 
technology investment, technology adoption, fuel economy improvement on road and 
so on. As far as we can see, the structure of the model conforms to the physical reality 
and realism of decision rules. 
6.4 Dimensional Consistency Test 
Dimensional inconsistency may reveal nothing more than a typographical error, 
an inverted ratio, or missing time constant. More often, units’ errors reveal important 
flaw in the understanding of the structure or decision process we are trying to model. 
We always specify the units of measure for each variable as we build our models. 
Fortunately, the simulation software we are using for system dynamics modeling now 
include automated dimensional analysis so we can test for dimensional errors with a 
single command. Our model generates no error messages when we run the 
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dimensional consistency check. Every equation is dimensionally consistent without 
the inclusion of arbitrary scaling factors that have no real world meaning. 
6.5 Parameter Assessment Test 
Limitations on numerical data availability mean it is often impossible to estimate 
all parameters in a model. In practice, statistical and judgmental methods are used 
together. Knowledge of the real system constrains the plausible range for many 
parameters; statistical estimation provides a check on judgmental estimates. 
For the current model, we collect data from archival materials, direct experience, 
professional websites, related literatures and some estimates from authority such 
United Nations, National Statistical Bureau in China, British Petroleum, State 
Information Centre of China and so on.   
6.6 Extreme Condition Test 
Models should be robust in extreme conditions. Robustness under extreme 
conditions means the model should behave in a realistic fashion no matter how 
extreme the inputs or policies imposed on it may be. Extreme condition tests ask 
whether models behave appropriately when the inputs take on extreme values such as 
zero or infinity. Extreme condition tests can be carried out in two main ways: by 
direct inspection of the model equations and by simulation. 
We have checked the equation along with the structure assessment test and it 
seems reasonable for us. Following, we check some simulation results when the 
gasoline price before tax suddenly drops to zero from 2007 until the end of 
simulation. 
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Figure 6-1 Extreme Test – Gasoline Price Zero 
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Figure 6-2 Extreme Test Behavior – Gasoline Price Zero 
As we do not have any gasoline tax at this point, people can enjoy a free lunch for 
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gasoline when the price drops to zero after 2007. They can use as much gasoline as 
they wish and it is totally free. Most consumers may not pay attention to the fuel 
economy of new cars any more. Some of them may prefer worse fuel economy to 
enjoy a more powerful engine. As a result, automakers are reluctant to improve the 
fuel economy as before and some of them even change the fuel economy in a negative 
way to meet consumers’ demand. Thus, we see an increase in fuel economy, which is 
measured by the liters of gasoline consumed per one hundred kilometers, from 11 
liter/100-km to nearly 14 liter/100-km. 
In the meantime, the total gasoline consumption reaches 1.17+012e which is 
more than double of the number in the base run. The total consumption does not show 
a dramatically aggressive increase in the extreme condition test because of two main 
reasons. The first one is that people would just drive some maximum kilometers in 
one year and no more than that even the gasoline is free. The second one is that auto 
manufactures would not necessarily turn to worse fuel economy car production due to 
some cost and benefit concern. With these two limits, the total gasoline consumption 
would not increase infinitely.  
For the actual cost per vehicle kilometer, in stead of staying flat after the drop in 
gasoline price, the costs see some tiny increase in the simulation. Why? Because 
consumers have to pay a premium for the car they want. Automakers are willing to do 
some change to make consumer happy but they certainly put a markup on the car 
price to make up what it costs. This is consistent with what happens in reality. 
Consumers would like to pay a little more to get some additional and cool features of 
the car. 
In a word, the simulation results in the extreme conditions test are in line with 
what we have known in reality. 
6.7 Sensitivity Analysis 
Since all models are wrong we must test the robustness of our conclusion to 
uncertainty in our assumptions. Sensitivity analysis asks whether the conclusions 
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change in ways important to the purpose when assumptions are varied over the 
plausible range of uncertainty. 
There are three types of sensitivity: numerical, behavior mode, and policy 
sensitivity. Numerical sensitivity exists when a change in assumption changes the 
numerical values of the results. Behavior mode sensitivity exists when a change in 
assumptions changes the patterns of behavior generated by the model. Policy 
sensitivity exists when a change in assumptions reverses the impacts or desirability of 
a proposed policy. 
Given the limited time and resources, sensitivity analysis must focus on those 
relationships and parameters we suspect are both highly uncertain and likely to be 
influential. A parameter around which no uncertainty exists need not be tested. 
Likewise, if a parameter has but little effect on the dynamics it need not be tested even 
if its value is highly uncertain because estimation errors are of little consequence. In 
the following part of text, we show the model sensitivity to economy growth rate, 
desired ownership rate and relative technology cost. 
6.7.1 Economy Growth Rate 
The economy in China has kept on increasing for a few years. It is predicted by 
some economists that it will continue to grow on an average rate of 7% per year to the 
year 2030. As the economy becomes more mature, it is possible that our economy 
growth will slow down. Will it affect the general behavior for the problem we are 
dealing with? To get an insight, we test three different economy growth rates here. 
From year 2007, the economy growth rate is set to be 2% lower (Eco1), equal to 
(Base) and 2% higher (Eco2) than the average growth rate from 1995 to 2006, 5.5% 
for rural area and 7.5% for urban area.  
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Figure 6-3 Different Economy Growth Rate 
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Figure 6-4 Sensitivity Behavior - Different Economy Growth Rate 
The variation in the economy growth rate does not result in behavioral changes in 
the key variables as can be observed in Figure 6-4. The higher growth rate leads to 
more total private car ownership, greater total gasoline consumptions and higher cost 
per vehicle kilometer. In the case of average fuel economy, all of them show the 
behavior of overshoot before reaching equilibrium. However, it peaks earlier at a 
higher point when the economy growth rate is higher. These behaviors are consistent 
with what we have known about the reality. 
6.7.2 Desired Private Ownership per Household 
The desired private ownership per household table we are using contains adjusted 
data from a survey held by State Information Centre of China. People tend to be 
overconfident in their judgments. Judgmental parameter estimates are likely to be 
more uncertain than people’s intuitive confidence bounds suggest. Overconfidence 
also arises when parameters are estimated statistically. Given the uncertainty and 
nuisances in the survey, we adjust the desired private ownership in two opposite 
directions from the original one to check its influence on the pattern of model 
behavior. With the same income level, Do1 has fewer cars per household than Base, 
which has fewer than Do2. 
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   Do1                                        Base  
   
           Do2 
 
Figure 6-5 Different Desired Ownership Rate 
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total gasoline consumption
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Figure 6-6 Sensitivity Behavior - Different Desired Ownership Rate 
Again, no behavioral changes can be observed in this test. The higher desired 
ownership rate sees the quicker development of total private car ownership and larger 
consumption of gasoline. Since the average fuel economy considers the fuel economy 
of both old and new cars on road, the less desired ownership rate causes less inflow of 
new car purchase, making the improvement of fuel economy on road more slowly 
than it otherwise would be. Provided other features unchanged, the car with better fuel 
economy can charge a little bit more than the poor one. As the fuel consumption 
improvement has been slowed down, the car with certain fuel economy, which is 
considered poor in the case of higher desired ownership rate, could enjoy the premium 
for a longer time. This makes the annual insurance and depreciation stay high for a 
longer time. As a result, the average fuel economy and cost per vehicle kilometer is 
worst in Do1. 
The behavior of this sensitivity test conforms to both the physical reality and 
known decision rules. 
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6.7.3 Relative Technology Cost 
The relative technology cost represents the relationship of cost and technology 
improvement for fuel economy. As the technology is reaching its bottleneck, we need 
more money for the same level of improvement as we did before. Unfortunately, we 
are unable to get the exact number to figure out the exact curve. We collect some 
discrete relevant data from professional website, news, expert interview and so on. 
However, the output of tech investment can be very sensitive to these data. Here we 
test three different curves as follows to see if it would change the behavior of the 
model significantly. 
            TC1                                    Base  
  
      
TC2  
 
Figure 6-7 Different Relative Technology Cost 
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Figure 6-8 Sensitivity Behavior - Different Relative Technology Cost 
As what can be seen from the Figure 6-8, the relative technology cost does not 
significantly change the model behavior. The steepest curve, which means money 
helps to improve the fuel economy most at the beginning, gets the best result of 
average fuel economy on road, least total gasoline consumption and least cost per 
vehicle kilometer. 
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Chapter 7 Behavior Analysis and Policy Design 
7.1 Base Run 
In the base run, the value before 2007 are from historical data and after that the 
gasoline price stays constant from 2007 to the end of the simulation. Additionally, no 
gasoline tax is imposed on consumers. 
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Figure 7-1 Base Run – Gasoline Price before Tax 
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desired car for different price classification
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Figure 7-2 Base Run – Private Car Ownership 
Due to the rising buying power of Chinese consumers, the private car ownership 
continues to increase dramatically. The baseline projection for seven car categories is 
shown in Figure 7-2. As time passes by, the desired private car ownership will 
concentrate on higher price levels, which normally consist of cars with bigger size and 
more powerful engine, consuming more gasoline per 100 kilometers. Year 2030 sees 
the dominance of cars in the price range between 100,000 and 230,000 in the whole 
market.  
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Figure 7-3 Base Run – Average Fuel Economy 
Fuel economy is the amount of fuel required to move a vehicle over a given 
distance. Fuel economy is usually expressed in one of two ways: 
 The amount of fuel used per unit distance; for example, liters per 100 
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kilometers (L/100 km). In this case, the lower the value, the more economic a 
vehicle is (the less fuel it needs to travel a certain distance);  
 The distance traveled per unit volume of fuel used; for example, kilometers 
per liter (km/L). In this case, the higher the value, the more economic a 
vehicle is (the more distance it can travel with a certain volume of fuel).   
Here in our model, we use the term of liters per 100 kilometers to express the fuel 
economy, so the lower the value, the more economic a vehicle is. The average fuel 
economy shows the behavior of overshoot. Even after the gasoline price stays 
constant from 2007, it does not reach equilibrium immediately. Fuel economy 
continues to increase at a decreasing rate until it peaks in the year around 2020. Then 
it begins to decrease and stays at the equilibrium from year 2028. 
From the model description in Chapter 5, we know that the average fuel economy 
on road improves by the inflow of new, better fuel economy cars and the outflow of 
old, poor fuel economy cars. The fuel efficiency improvement is driven by consumers’ 
preference for better fuel efficient car and automakers willingness to improve fuel 
economy of new cars, which is influenced by the cost and benefit of fuel-efficient and 
non fuel-efficient car sales.  
Therefore, the behavior shown above in Figure 7-3 results from the increasing 
purchase of more expensive car, which is relatively bigger and consumes more fuel 
than smaller car, and the slow improvement of fuel economy. 
Some people tend to buy cars with better fuel efficiency for the same price range, 
but the higher the car price, the lower percentage of people would like to buy 
economy model of that price range. Since the gasoline price stays constant from 2007, 
we can expect this percentage decrease. As a result of the dropping market share of 
‘fuel efficient cars’, which consumes less gasoline per 100 kilometers than the 
average fuel consumption in its category, automakers lower the factional technology 
investment rate, making the improvement in fuel consumption more slowly. They do 
not have much incentive, namely profit, to improve fuel efficiency. 
Besides, even automakers invest in technology development and adoption 
unconditionally, it takes some time for the prototype to become car on the product line, 
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and then on the market, on the road. 
total gasoline consumption
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Figure 7-4 Base Run – Total Gasoline Consumption 
The total gasoline consumption is determined by average vehicle kilometers per 
year, fuel economy and total private car ownership. The first two are influenced 
directly and indirectly by gasoline price with some delay. When the price is higher, we 
drive less and demand for better fuel economy. The total private car ownership is 
decided by income level. Since the effect of increasing private car sales on boosting 
gasoline consumption is stronger than the effect of increasing or stagnant gasoline 
price on lowering gasoline consumption, the total gasoline consumption continues to 
grow and shows an exponential growth. 
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Figure 7-5 Base Run – Cost per Vehicle-km 
The total cost includes car insurance, annual depreciation, gasoline expenditure 
and other operating cost and tax. As fuel economy improves slowly, the gasoline 
expenditure decrease slowly as well. On one hand, the improvement of fuel economy 
causes new car price rising. On the other hand, it takes time for the reduction effect of 
gasoline consumption per car to take place. Consequently, the cost per vehicle 
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kilometer continues to grow until the reduction effect from technology adoption can 
offset the increase effect from rising car price. 
7.2 Scenario 1: Gasoline Price Stay Constant 
7.2.1 Gasoline Tax from 2007 and Remove in 2015 
In this scenario, the gasoline price stays constant from year 2007. We would like 
to see the damage of gasoline tax policy in this situation. The gasoline tax is imposed 
in year 2007. After seeing gasoline price stay constant for a few years, we remove the 
tax in 2015. The analysis focuses on the different performance of average fuel 
economy on road, total gasoline consumption and cost per vehicle kilometer. 
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Figure 7-6 Scenario 1 – Gasoline Price after Tax 
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total gasoline consumption
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Figure 7-7 Scenario 1 – Tax and Removal Behavior 
Compared to the baseline projection, the average fuel economy on road improves 
a little after the tax imposition. Even the tax is removed in 2015; it stays lower than 
the base run. Besides, the total gasoline consumption sees a slower increasing rate. 
Yet, the tax increase the actual cost per vehicle-km from year 2007 to year 2020, and 
it almost equals the base projection after that. 
The tax here slightly improves the average fuel economy and total gasoline 
consumption but increase the cost per vehicle-km a lot during the tax years. 
7.2.2 Tech Subsidy from Gasoline Tax 
We try to use all the collected tax as a technology development subsidy for auto 
manufactures. The same indexes are analyzed. 
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Figure 7-8 Scenario 1 – Tech Subsidy Behavior 
The tech subsidy helps to further improve the average fuel economy. Even though 
the gasoline tax stops in year 2015, the improvement does not stop until year 2020. 
Though the fuel economy is still much better than in the cases with no tax or tax 
without subsidy at the end, it begins to increase a bit and reaches its equilibrium after 
2020. It is probably due to the fact that auto manufactures sees no further benefit from 
fuel efficient car sales, so they reduce or stop further technology adoption on product 
line.  
The total gasoline consumption decreases more, compared to the policy of tax 
2007. Coming to the cost per v-km, tech subsidy drives the cost less than the no tax 
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case in 2018, much earlier than the other policy. Additionally, it reaches a lowest cost 
among the three situations. Yet the cost reduction is far less than the cost increase due 
to tax imposition. 
7.2.3 Tax Refund to Consumers 
Assume we can give back the gasoline tax to consumers secretly without 
affecting the tax impact on average fuel economy and total gasoline consumption.  
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Figure 7-9 Scenario 1 – Tax Refund Behavior 
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As what we have supposed, the behaviors of fuel economy and gasoline 
consumption are the same as in the case of no tax refund. However, even we refund 
the gasoline tax to consumers; it cannot completely make up of the increase cost.  
The increasing cost comes from two parts. The first is the rising gasoline price 
and the second is the rising car price. After the rise of gasoline price, consumers show 
desire for more fuel efficient cars. In light of strong demand, automakers begin to 
apply more advanced technology into production and enjoy a markup on car price due 
to improvement of car fuel efficiency. Considering the rising gasoline expenditure, 
consumer would like to pay more for the car to get better fuel efficiency.  
The tax refund can immediately offset the cost increase from rising gasoline price 
but not the car price. Car price is determined by the relative fuel economy of new 
product to the average on the market. Once automakers start production, it is not easy 
to change their product line overnight. As a result, the price markup from more 
favorable fuel efficiency would stay until a new product with better fuel efficiency 
appears on the market. 
7.3 Scenario 2: Gasoline Price Step Increase 
7.3.1 No Gasoline Tax Application 
In scenario two, we assume the gasoline price suddenly double in 2015 and stay 
constant to the end of the simulation. First, we try to see what happen if we do 
nothing about it. Then, we apply the gasoline tax to the model to see if we can reduce 
the loss or change some unfavorable behavior. 
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Figure 7-10 Scenario 2 – Gasoline Price before Tax 
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Figure 7-11 Scenario 2 – Average Fuel Economy 
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Figure 7-12 Scenario 2 – Total Gasoline Consumption 
A few years after the gasoline price double in 2015, consumers’ desire for better 
fuel efficiency car grows, making automakers to invest more on technology 
development and adoption. As the fuel economy of new car is much better than before, 
the average fuel economy on road improves. We see the curve peak lower and drop to 
a lower equilibrium sooner than in the base run. In the meantime, car owners restrict 
their driving, namely vehicle kilometers, to some extent, trying to reduce the gasoline 
expenditure due to the rising gasoline price. Thus, better fuel economy and less 
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vehicle kilometers, contribute to the decrease of the total gasoline consumption. 
So far, the effect of the doubling gasoline price seems favorable; the average fuel 
economy on road improves and total gasoline consumption decrease. How about the 
cost? 
actual cost per vehicle-km
4
3
2
1
0
2 2
2 2
2
2 2
2 2
2
2 2
2 2 2 2
1 1
1 1
1
1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1 1 1
1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030
Time (Year)
"actual cost per vehicle-km" : Base yuan97/km1 1 1 1 1 1 1
"actual cost per vehicle-km" : Step2015 yuan97/km2 2 2 2 2 2
 
Figure 7-13 Scenario 2 – Cost per Vehicle-km 
Even though car owners drive less to reduce gasoline expenditure, new purchase 
sees preference for better fuel efficiency, and automakers try to improve fuel economy 
of new cars, they cannot completely neutralize the increase effect for cost per vehicle 
kilometer. Can we reduce this cost by applying the gasoline tax without adding 
unfavorable effect to the average fuel economy and total gasoline consumption? 
7.3.2 Gasoline Tax from 2014 
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Figure 7-14 Scenario 2 – Gasoline Price after Tax in 2014 
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Figure 7-15 Scenario 2 – Tax 2014 – Average Fuel Economy 
Here, we are applying a 100% gasoline tax one year in advance and stop the tax 
when the gasoline price doubles in 2015. From Figure 7-15, we find that one year’s 
tax has almost no effect on the improvement of the situation. Delay should be taken 
into consideration and the tax should be applied well before to get some favorable 
results. Following we would focus on the gasoline tax from 2007 to see its effect. 
7.3.3 Gasoline Tax from 2007 
Below in Figure 7-16, 100% gasoline tax is applied from the year 2007 and stop 
when the gasoline price before tax doubles in 2015. It means consumers are bearing 
the same gasoline price since 2007. 
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Figure 7-16 Scenario 2 – Tax 2007 – Gasoline Price after Tax 
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Figure 7-17 Scenario 2 – Tax 2007 – Behavior Comparison 
After implementing the gasoline tax in 2007, average fuel economy on road and 
total gasoline consumption show better performance than in the case without any 
policy application. The cost per vehicle-km increases from the year 2007 and stays 
under the curve of step2015 from 2020 to 2030. However, all the effects are not so 
convincing because the difference is hard to see. 
7.3.4 Tax Refund to Consumers 
As what we did in scenario 1, here we also apply the tax refund in scenario 2, 
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without any influence on the tax effect on average fuel economy and total gasoline 
consumption. 
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Figure 7-18 Scenario 2 – Tax Refund – Behavior Comparison 
The actual cost per vehicle kilometer shows better performance than the previous 
one in figure 7-18. It reduces almost half the increasing cost. Yet it makes up the cost 
increase from gasoline tax but not from the car price.  
7.3.5 Tech Development Subsidy from Gasoline Tax 
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Figure 7-19 Scenario 2 – Tech Subsidy – Behavior Comparison 
The figure 7-19 shows the different tracks for three different situations. Step2015 
stands for a step increase in gasoline price without any policy. Tax 2007 represents a 
gasoline tax from the year 2007. Tech1 shows the behavior when we put the collected 
tax as a subsidy for automakers’ technology development. 
With the application of tech subsidy, the effect becomes more obvious. For 
average fuel economy on road, step2015 peaks in the year around 2020, tax 2007 
peaks in the year 2015 and tech1 peaks in 2010. Tech1 dips immediately after it 
reaches its peak and reaches the lowest point among the three, in terms of liters per 
vehicle kilometer. In contrary, step2015 and tax2007 decrease very slowly to reach a 
higher equilibrium. 
For the total gasoline consumption, the tech subsidy also shows a larger reduction 
for gasoline consumption than only tax implementation. 
Referring to the cost per vehicle kilometer, tech1 begins to be lower than the 
others from year 2015. It is nearly twice lower than the case in tax2007 and the gap is 
enlarged through the end of the simulation. 
7.4 Scenario 3: Gasoline Price Linear Increase 
7.4.1 No Gasoline Tax Application  
In scenario three, the gasoline price is assumed to increase linearly from 2007 to 
2015, when it doubles its price from 2006. Similarly, no gasoline tax application, 
gasoline tax from 2007 and technology subsidy are simulated to compare different 
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average fuel economy on road, total gasoline consumption and cost per vehicle 
kilometer. 
after shock real gasoline price before tax
10
7.5
5
2.5
0
2 2
2 2
2
2
2
2
2 2 2 2 2 2 2
1 1
1 1
1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030
Time (Year)
after shock real gasoline price before tax : Base yuan97/l1 1 1 1 1
after shock real gasoline price before tax : Gra2015 yuan97/l2 2 2 2
 
Figure 7-20 Scenario 3 – Gasoline Price before Tax 
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actual cost per vehicle-km
4
3
2
1
0
2 2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2 2 2 2 2
1 1
1
1
1
1 1
1 1
1 1 1 1 1
1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030
Time (Year)
"actual cost per vehicle-km" : Base yuan97/km1 1 1 1 1 1
"actual cost per vehicle-km" : Gra2015 yuan97/km2 2 2 2 2
   
Figure 7-21 Scenario 3 – No Gasoline Tax Behavior 
Similar to the behavior in scenario two, we see average fuel economy on road 
improving after peaking in the year around 2015. Total gasoline consumption increase 
more slowly than in the base run. Actual cost per vehicle kilometer is higher than that 
in the base run. Following, we are trying to explore the potential solution to reduce 
cost while remaining the benefit from average fuel economy improvement and more 
slowly increased total gasoline consumption. 
7.4.2 Gasoline Tax from 2007 
Below in Figure 7-22, gasoline tax is implemented from the year 2007. The tax 
rate is adjusted to keep the gasoline price after tax twice as much as what it is in 2006. 
When the price before tax doubles in 2015, all the taxes are removed. So, for 
consumers, the price they have to pay is always twice as that in 2006 from 2007. 
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Figure 7-22 Scenario 3 – Tax 2007 – Gasoline Price after Tax 
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Figure 7-23 Scenario 3 – Tax 2007 – Behavior Comparison 
Unfortunately, in this comparison, we cannot see any obvious improvement after 
the tax implementation in 2007. Average fuel economy on road stays nearly the same, 
and so does the total gasoline consumption. 
7.4.3 Tech Development Subsidy from Gasoline Tax 
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total gasoline consumption
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Figure 7-24 Scenario 3 – Tech Subsidy – Behavior Comparison 
Still, we can see the favorable contribution from technology subsidy. The average 
fuel economy on road reaches its peak around 2010, which is much earlier than in the 
other two cases. It begins to drop dramatically thereafter and reaches a lower 
equilibrium point in year 2025. The total gasoline consumption increases more slowly 
and the cost per vehicle kilometer keeps lower than it is in other cases from the year 
2015. 
7.5 Implication 
In the scenario when gasoline price stays constant since year 2007, we can clearly 
identify the impact of gasoline tax on cost per vehicle kilometer. Even though we 
refund all the tax collection to consumers, we can only offset the cost increase from 
gasoline price but not that from car price. The average fuel economy on road and total 
gasoline consumption shows better performance after tax imposition though. 
The behavior analysis and policy design above implies the effect of gasoline tax 
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if the gasoline price before tax in 2015 reaches twice as much as it is in 2006. In the 
step increase scenario, the earlier gasoline tax implementation proves a better and 
more obvious effect. Taking the collected tax as technology development subsidy to 
automakers yields the most favorable result among the three situations – no tax, tax 
from 2007 and tech subsidy. 
In the linear increase scenario, tax from 2007 is unable to get an effect as good as 
before. However, the technology development subsidy keeps a good record. It 
improves the average fuel economy on road, slows down the increase of total gasoline 
consumption and reduces the cost per vehicle kilometer. 
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Chapter 8 Conclusion 
8.1 Major Findings and Results 
8.1.1 Understanding of the System 
From the base run, we can understand some basic dynamics of the system.  
Ubiquitous delay 
Delays are pervasive. It takes time to measure and report information. It takes 
time to make decisions. And it takes time for decisions to affect the state of a system. 
A delay is a process in which output lags behind its input in some fashion. Delays are 
a critical source of dynamics in nearly all systems.  
In contrary to what people might think, the average fuel economy on road does 
not stay unchanged immediately after the gasoline price becomes constantly flat. 
Instead, it continually gets worse before going down back to a better equilibrium point. 
People need time to adjust their expectation of gasoline price, their preference for car 
purchase and their driven distance. Also, it takes time for automakers to collect 
information about consumer behavior, and alter investment in technology 
development and adoption. Last but not the least, car with new fuel economy cannot 
replace the old ones overnight and it would stay on the road for a long time before it is 
scrapped. In summary, what we do today takes time to get the result. 
Inconsistent event-based decision making 
Besides, faced with the overwhelming complexity of the real world, time pressure, 
and limited cognitive capabilities, we are forced to fall back on rote procedures, habits, 
rules of thumb, and simple mental models to make decisions. In the process of 
modeling, we refer to some literatures, surveys and make some informal interviews to 
decide the decision rule of consumers and automakers. We find that people usually 
make decisions based on simple events. 
Consumers make their purchase decisions simply by investigating costs for 
different cars. Automakers make investment and substitution by calculating costs and 
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benefits on hand. The mental models people use to guide their decisions are 
dynamically deficient. They generally adopt an event-based, open-loop view of 
causality, ignore feedback processes. Hence the decisions they made are not 
consistent all through the time and normally short sighted, which is contrary to 
perfectly rational. 
8.1.2 Hints for Policy Making 
We hope to see from the model how much impact the government can have on 
leading the private economy toward energy conservation rather than ultimate visions 
of energy consumption markedly reduced from the one now in place. A better 
understanding of the dynamics of gasoline tax may be a good beginning to enlighten 
the government on this issue. 
Better early than late 
We assume a double gasoline price of year 2006 in year 2015. In the case of step 
increase, the improvement of average fuel economy on road and reduction of total 
gasoline consumption increase rate is more obvious if we implement gasoline tax 
earlier. The resulting effect from late action is almost the same as the case when no 
action is taken. In the case of linear increase, even the earlier action can only see 
slight improvement from the no action case. Needless to say how it works if we apply 
the policy much later than that. In light of what we understand from the model, we 
really should do the right things before it is too late. 
Worse before better 
Inevitably, consumer’s cost per vehicle kilometer is climbing after the 
implementation of gasoline tax. That’s the ground those against the gasoline tax stand 
on. Most of us agree that the gasoline price is highly likely to continue increasing in 
the future. From this point of view, it is reasonable for us to presume the increase in 
year 2015. We cannot argue the cost will be lower than it otherwise would be from the 
starting of gasoline tax collection. However, we surely see after the increase of 
gasoline price, we enjoy a lower cost per vehicle kilometer mainly due to the 
improvement of fuel economy. Our spending is better off after a slight increase in the 
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first few years. At the end, we not only see the technology improvement, total 
gasoline consumption reduction, but also cost reduction. As a policy maker aiming at 
long-term social effect, we should learn to stand the worse result for a short time and 
be glad to see better after worse. 
Neutralized tax 
We tested the policy of putting collected tax into technology development as a 
subsidy. This policy is revenue-neutral, meaning that the amount of money collected 
through tax equals the amount paid out in subsidy. In all price increase scenarios, tech 
subsidy receives more obvious and more favorable effects amid the three. 
Fuel tax creates important price signals that can make consumers aware of the 
non-internalized costs of fuel consumption and remind buyers to take into account the 
additional cost such as high gasoline taxes or poor gasoline vehicle-km when 
purchasing a car. Also, fuel tax raises funds to promote greater fuel efficiency, 
increasing the profitability of new car.  
However, if the gasoline price does not rise at all, the gasoline tax could make 
some damage to car owners. The tax or tech subsidy can reach a lower cost at the end, 
but tax refund to consumers is probably not enough to cover the cost increase due to 
tax imposition. The tax can not only increase the gasoline price but also the new car 
price. Even the gasoline price is highly unlikely to stay constant; we should keep this 
special situation in mind when making policies. 
8.2 Limitations and Future Work 
This research is limited in nature by the boundary chosen. The total gasoline 
consumption is determined by the vehicle ownership, vehicle kilometer driven and 
fuel economy. The energy conservation impact from kilometer traveled is limited by 
the exclusion of public transportation in the current model. 
Besides, we only consider the first-time buyer for private vehicles, neglecting 
trade in cycle and the used car market so far As the economy strengthened along the 
time, trade in and used car market may play a more and more important role in 
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China’s vehicle market.  
Even car purchase is mainly determined by the disposable income and vehicle 
selling prices, but these are not the only ones. Vehicle operating costs, availability of 
financing, terms of financing, interest rates, and various fees and taxes are having a 
bigger effect on people’s purchase behavior. Those factors may be taken into account 
to more precisely reflect the development of China’s vehicle market. 
The aggregation is high in this study. Automakers are considered as a whole party 
and the competition in the auto industry is not addressed by the model. Diesel 
powered private passenger vehicles are not distinguished from gasoline driven 
vehicles. 
Along with extension to bus, taxi and institutional vehicle market for the model 
structure, more policies besides gasoline tax can be tested and externalized cost such 
as CO2 emission may be considered. 
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Appendixes 
Appendix 1 Model Structure 
1.1 Desired Private ownership 
desired private ownership
gini coefficient
RURAL GINI
COEFFICIENT TABLE
URBAN GINI
COEFFICIENT TABLE
STANDARD DEVIATION
OVER MEAN RATIO
TABLE standard deviation of
household income
relative mean real disposable
income per household
mean real disposable
income per household REFERENCE
INCOME
adjusted income
level
INCOME CLASS SIZE
DESIRED PRIVATE OWNERSHIP
PER HOUSEHOLD TABLE
desired private ownership
per household
RURAL HOUSEHOLD
NUMBER TABLE
URBAN HOUSEHOLD
NUMBER TABLE
household number
MEAN REAL DISPOSABLE INCOME
PER URBAN HOUSEHOLD TABLE MEAN REAL DISPOSABLE INCOME
PER RURAL HOUSEHOLD TABLE
<Time>
<Time>
share of households below
different income level
households in
income classes
share of households in
different income classes
CAR TAX RATE
1994
CAR TAX RATE
2006
<Time>
income level
 
1.2 Propensity to Purchase Fuel Efficient Car for the same price range 
propensity to purchase fuel efficient car
for the same price range
LOGIT PARAMETER
relative main cost
expected main cost
REFERENCE COST
expected annual
depreciation
expected gasoline
expenditure per car
expected insurance
INSURANCE RATE
<fuel economy> <NORMAL ANNUAL VEHICLE-KM>
expected registration fee
<expected long-term gasoline price>
Expected Car Price
<actual car price>
<Expected Car Price>
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1.3 Private Car Ownership 
Private Car
private car purchase private car scrappage
CAR LIFE TIME
ADJUSTMENT TIME
desired private ownership
propensity to purchase fuel efficient
car for the same price range
INITIAL SHARE OF FUEL
EFFICIENT CARS
desired car for different
price classification
initial private car of
different fuel efficiency total private car
INITIAL PRIVATE CAR
 
1.4 Technology Investment Rate 
revenue
fuel efficient car
market share
INITIAL FRACTIONAL
INVESTMENT RATE
technology
investment rate
effect of fuel efficient car sales
on technology investmentfractional tech
investment rate
INITIAL FUEL EFFICIENT
CAR MARKET SHARErelative fuel efficient
car market share
EFFECT OF FUEL EFFICIENT CAR SALES
ON TECHNOLOGY INVESTMENT TABLE
total revenue
<indicated car price>
Actual Car Price
relative expected
long-term gasoline price
expected Long-term
Gasoline Price
INITIAL EXPECTED LONG-TERM
GASOLINE PRICE
real gasoline price after tax
TIME TO ADJUST
LONG-TERM EXPECTATION
after shock real gasoline
price before tax
tax rate
price shock
real gasoline price
before tax
<Time>
ELASTICITY OF TECH
INVESTMENT TO GAS PRICE
effect of gas price on
tech investment
<fuel economy of new car>
fuel efficient car
purchase
<INITIAL FUEL ECONOMY>
Perceived Fuel
Economy Of New Car
<private car purchase>
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1.5 Fuel Economy 
indicated relative fuel
consumption
Fuel Consumption
Of Cars On Road
fuel consumption
improvement on road
INITIAL FUEL
ECONOMY
Relative Fuel Economy
Of Prototypetech improvement
<technology investment rate>
fuel consumption
discard on road
RELATIVE TECH COST TABLE
INITIAL COST FOR NEW PROTOTYPE
<private car purchase>
<private car>
<private car scrappage>fuel economy
average fuel
economy
fuel economy of
new car
willingness to change
fuel economy
Relative Fuel Economy
Of New Car
fuel consumption
improvement of new
car
TIME TO APPLY TECH
ON PRODUCT LINE
TIME TO ALLOCATE TECH INVESTMENT
Tech Investment
Allocation
TIME TO DEVELOP TECH
<relative expected
long-term gasoline price>
ELASTICITY OF FUEL ECONOMY
TO GASOLINE PRICE desired fuel economy
INITIAL DESIRED FUEL ECONOMY
<total tax>
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1.6 Willingness to Change Fuel Economy 
fuel economy of new car
average fuel economy of new car
PRODUCT LIFE TIME
PRODUCT LINE TRANSITION COST
willingness to change fuel economy
production cost
per car
AVERAGE CAR
PRICE
annual transition
cost
indicated revenue
indicated car price
indicated profit
relative profit
REFERENCE PROFIT
<LOGIT PARAMETER>
<average profit margin>
expected fuel
economy of new car
<INITIAL FUEL ECONOMY>
expected demand
<private car purchase>
<expected fractional growth rate>
<TIME TO APPLY TECH
ON PRODUCT LINE>
<expected
demand>
Expected Average Fuel Economy Of New Car
REFERENCE TIME
MAXIMUM CAR
PRICE
MINIMUM CAR
PRICE
<desired fuel economy>
<relative fuel economy
of prototype>
 
1.7 Expected Fractional Growth Rate 
perceived
Present
Condition
(ppc)change in ppc
reference
Condition (rc)
change in rc
perceived
Trend (trend)
change in trend
TIME TO PERCEIVE
PRESENT CONDITION
(TPPC)
TIME HORIZON FOR
REFERENCE
CONDITION (THRC)
TIME TO PERCEIVE
TREND (TPT)
input indicated trend
(itrend)
output
expected fractional
growth rate
<private car purchase>
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1.8 Cost 
AVERAGE ROAD
MAINTENANCE TAX
REPARIS AND
MAINTENANCE COST
gasoline expenditure
per gasoline car
annual cost
<real gasoline price
after tax>
gasoline consumption
per car
insurance
registration fee
<CAR LIFE TIME>
annual
depreciation
<INSURANCE RATE>
average vehicle
kilometers
<fuel economy> effect of gasoline price
on average vehicle-km
NORMAL ANNUAL
VEHICLE-KM
ELASTICITY OF VEHICLE-KM
TO GASOLINE PRICE
relative expected short-term
gasoline price
expected Short-term
Gasoline Price
INITIAL EXPECTED
SHORT-TERM GASOLINE PRICE
TIME TO ADJUST
SHORT-TERM EXPECTATION
gasoline
consumption
<Private Car>
total gasoline
consumption
total cost
<Private Car>
<Actual Car Price>
total tax
<tax rate><after shock real gasoline
price before tax>
MAXIMUM
VEHICLE-KM
categorised
private car
total actual
vehicle-kmactual cost per
vehicle-km
<average vehicle
kilometers>
categorized actual cost
per vehicle-km
<average vehicle kilometers>
<total tax>tax refund per
vehicle-km
adjusted cost per
vehicle-km
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Appendix 2 Equations and Documentation 
2.1 Subscripts 
area: 
 rural,urban 
 
car: 
 price less than 50k, price 50k to 100k,price 100k to 160k,price 160k to 230k,price 
230k to 300k,price 300k to 500k,price over 500k 
 
efficiency: 
 fuel efficient, non fuel efficient 
 
inco 110k to 160k: 
 (income 11-income 16) 
  
inco 170k to 230k: 
 (income 17-income 23) 
 
inco 240k to 300k: 
 (income 24-income 30) 
 
inco 30K TO 50K: 
 (income 3-income 5) 
 
inco 310k to 500k: 
 (income 31-income 50) 
 
inco 60k to 100k: 
 (income 6-income 10) 
 
inco over 500k: 
 income over 50 
 
income class: 
 (income 1-income 50), income over 50 
 
income price class: 
 income less than 30k,income 30k to 50k,income 60k to 100k,income 110k to 
160k,income 170k to 230k,income 240k to 300k, income 310k to 500k, income over 
500k 
 
less than 30k: 
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 income 1,income 2 
 
sub efficiency: 
 sub1,sub2 
 
2.2 Control Panel 
  Simulation Control Parameters 
 
FINAL TIME  = 2030 
 ~ Year 
 ~ The final time for the simulation. 
 
INITIAL TIME  = 1995 
 ~ Year 
 ~ The initial time for the simulation. 
 
SAVEPER  = 1 
 ~ Year [0,?] 
 ~ The frequency with which output is stored. 
 
TIME STEP  = 0.0625 
 ~ Year [0,?] 
 ~ The time step for the simulation. 
 
2.3 Car Section 
adjusted income level[income class]= 
 income class*income class size*(1-IF THEN ELSE(Time<2006, car tax rate 
1994[income class], car tax rate 2006[income class])) 
 ~ dmnl 
 ~ income class*INCOME CLASS SIZE 
   
adjustment time= 
1.5 
 ~ Year 
 ~ even the consumer can afford a car, he still needs some time to search in the 
market which car to buy or when to buy 
 
car tax rate 1994[income class]= 
 0.0458,0.0458,0.0458,0.0458,0.0458,0.0497,0.0497,0.0497,0.0497,0.0497,0.0503
,0.0503,0.0503,0.0503,0.0503,0.0503,0.0568,0.0568,0.0568,0.0568,0.0568,0.0568,0.0
568,0.0665,0.0665,0.0665,0.0665,0.0665,0.0665,0.0665,0.0698,0.0698,0.0698,0.0698
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,0.0698,0.0698,0.0698,0.0698,0.0698,0.0698,0.0698,0.0698,0.0698,0.0698,0.0698,0.0
698,0.0698,0.0698,0.0698,0.0698,0.0772 
 ~ dmnl 
 
car tax rate 2006[income class]= 
 0.03,0.03,0.03,0.03,0.03,0.0405,0.0405,0.0405,0.0405,0.0405,0.05,0.05,0.05,0.05
,0.05,0.05,0.0589,0.0589,0.0589,0.0589,0.0589,0.0589,0.0589,0.078,0.078,0.078,0.07
8,0.078,0.078,0.078,0.0946,0.0946,0.0946,0.0946,0.0946,0.0946,0.0946,0.0946,0.094
6,0.0946,0.0946,0.0946,0.0946,0.0946,0.0946,0.0946,0.0946,0.0946,0.0946,0.0946,0.
1477 
 ~ dmnl 
 
desired car for different price classification[price less than 50k]= 
 desired private ownership[income less than 30k]+desired private 
ownership[income 30k to 50k ] ~~| 
desired car for different price classification[price 50k to 100k]= 
 desired private ownership[income 60k to 100k] ~~| 
desired car for different price classification[price 100k to 160k]= 
 desired private ownership[income 110k to 160k] ~~| 
desired car for different price classification[price 160k to 230k]= 
 desired private ownership[income 170k to 230k] ~~| 
desired car for different price classification[price 230k to 300k]= 
 desired private ownership[income 240k to 300k] ~~| 
desired car for different price classification[price 300k to 500k]= 
 desired private ownership[income 310k to 500k] ~~| 
desired car for different price classification[price over 500k]= 
 desired private ownership[income over 500k] 
 ~ vehicle 
 ~ assume they will buy cars in a range according to their income class, not 
outside that range 
 
desired private ownership[income price class]= 
 desired private ownership per household[income price class]*households in 
income classes [income price class] 
 ~ vehicle 
 
desired private ownership per household[income less than 30k]= 
 SUM(desired private ownership per household table(adjusted income level[less 
than 30k!]))/2 ~~| 
desired private ownership per household[income 30k to 50k]= 
 SUM(desired private ownership per household table(adjusted income level[inco 
30K TO 50K!]))/3 ~~| 
desired private ownership per household[income 60k to 100k]= 
 SUM(desired private ownership per household table(adjusted income level[inco 
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60k to 100k!]))/5 ~~| 
desired private ownership per household[income 110k to 160k]= 
 SUM(desired private ownership per household table(adjusted income level[inco 
110k to 160k!]))/6 ~~| 
desired private ownership per household[income 170k to 230k]= 
 SUM(desired private ownership per household table(adjusted income level[inco 
170k to 230k!]))/7 ~~| 
desired private ownership per household[income 240k to 300k]= 
 SUM(desired private ownership per household table(adjusted income level[inco 
240k to 300k!]))/7 ~~| 
desired private ownership per household[income 310k to 500k]= 
 SUM(desired private ownership per household table(adjusted income level[inco 
310k to 500k!]))/20 ~~| 
desired private ownership per household[income over 500k]= 
 SUM(desired private ownership per household table(adjusted income level[inco 
over 500k!])) 
 ~ vehicle/household 
 
desired private ownership per household table( 
 [(0,0)-(600000,1.5)],(0,0),(11315,0.00109649),(16055,0.00285088),(19419,0.008
11404),(21406.7,0.0162281),(29357.8,0.0504386),(62385.3,0.216228),(121101,0.697
368),(166972,1.11842),(201835,1.27632),(247706,1.40789),(427523,1.45),(572477,1.
5)) 
 ~ vehicle/household 
 ~ State Information Centre of China 
 [(0,0)-(600000,1.5)],(0,0),(11315,0.00109649),(16055,0.00285088),(19419,0.008
11404),(21406.7,0.0162281),(29357.8,0.0504386),(62385.3,0.216228),(121101,0.697
368),(166972,1.11842),(201835,1.27632),(247706,1.40789),(427523,1.45),(572477,1.
5) 
  Do1 
 [(0,0)-(600000,1.5)],(0,0),(11315,0.00109649),(16055,0.00285088),(19419,0.008
11404),(36697.2,0.0263158),(62385.3,0.0921053),(100917,0.348684),(135780,0.638
158),(172477,0.986842),(240367,1.23026),(422018,1.34868),(565138,1.38158) 
  Do2 
 [(0,0)-(600000,1.7)],(0,0),(11315,0.00109649),(16055,0.00285088),(19419,0.008
11404),(21406.7,0.0162281),(29357.8,0.0504386),(49541.3,0.260965),(110092,0.767
982),(161468,1.24518),(201835,1.45395),(427523,1.52851),(570642,1.5807) 
   
effect of fuel efficient car sales on technology investment= 
 effect of fuel efficient car sales on technology investment table(relative fuel 
efficient car market share) 
 ~ dmnl 
 
effect of fuel efficient car sales on technology investment table( 
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 [(0,0)-(3,5)],(0.192661,0.570175),(0.504587,0.570175),(0.816514,0.767544),(1,1
),(1.26605,1.42544),(1.45872,1.95175),(1.56881,2.43421),(1.68807,3.11404),(1.7614
7,3.57456),(1.86239,3.99123),(1.94495,4.27632),(2.09174,4.47368),(2.25688,4.6271
9),(2.38532,4.67105),(2.55963,4.71491),(2.70642,4.75877),(2.87156,4.75877)) 
 ~ dmnl 
 
effect of gas price on tech investment= 
 "relative expected long-term gasoline price"^elasticity of tech investment to gas 
price 
 ~ dmnl 
 
elasticity of tech investment to gas price= 
 0.2 
 ~ dmnl 
 
expected annual depreciation[car,efficiency]= 
 (expected car price[car,efficiency]+expected registration fee[car,efficiency])/car 
life time 
 ~ yuan97/vehicle/Year 
 
expected car price[car,efficiency]= 
 DELAY N(actual car price[car,efficiency], 1, actual car price[car,efficiency], 1) 
 ~ yuan97/vehicle 
 
expected gasoline expenditure per car[car,efficiency]= 
 fuel economy[car,efficiency]*"normal annual vehicle-km"[car]/100*"expected 
long-term gasoline price" 
 ~ yuan97/vehicle/Year 
 
expected insurance[car,efficiency]= 
 400+expected car price[car,efficiency]*insurance rate+1300 
 ~ yuan97/vehicle/Year 
 ~ basic insurance for vehicle damage 
 
expected main cost[car,efficiency]= 
 expected annual depreciation[car,efficiency]+expected gasoline expenditure per 
car[car,efficiency]+expected insurance[car,efficiency] 
 ~ yuan97/vehicle/Year 
 
expected registration fee[car,efficiency]= 
 expected car price[car,efficiency]*0.1 
 ~ yuan97/vehicle 
 
fractional tech investment rate= 
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 initial fractional investment rate*effect of fuel efficient car sales on technology 
investment*effect of gas price on tech investment 
 ~ dmnl 
 ~ INITIAL FRACTIONAL INVESTMENT RATE*effect of fuel efficient car 
sales on technology investment 
 
fuel efficient car market share= 
 (SUM(fuel efficient car purchase[car!,efficiency!])/2)/SUM(private car 
purchase[car!,efficiency!]) 
 ~ dmnl 
 ~ SUM(private car purchase[car!,FUEL EFFICIENT])/SUM(private car 
purchase[car!,efficiency!]) 
 
fuel efficient car purchase[car,efficiency]= 
 IF THEN ELSE(perceived fuel economy of new car[car,fuel efficient]<perceived 
fuel economy of new car [car,non fuel efficient], private car purchase[car,fuel 
efficient], private car purchase[car,non fuel efficient]) 
 ~ vehicle/Year 
  
gini coefficient[rural]= 
 rural gini coefficient table(Time) ~~| 
gini coefficient[urban]= 
 urban gini coefficient table(Time) 
 ~ dmnl 
 
household number[rural]= 
 rural household number table(Time) ~~| 
household number[urban]= 
 urban household number table(Time) 
 ~ household 
 
households in income classes[income price class]= 
 SUM(household number[area!]*share of households in different income 
classes[area!,income price class]) 
 ~ household 
 
income class size= 
 10000 
 ~ dmnl 
 
income level[income class]= 
 income class*income class size 
 ~ dmnl 
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initial fractional investment rate= 
 0.0063 
 ~ dmnl 
 
initial fuel efficient car market share= INITIAL( 
 fuel efficient car market share) 
 ~ dmnl 
 
initial private car[car]= 
 1.10764e+006, 32846, 1000, 10, 0, 0, 0 
 ~ vehicle 
 
initial private car of different fuel efficiency[car,fuel efficient]= 
 initial private car[car]*initial share of fuel efficient cars[car] ~~| 
initial private car of different fuel efficiency[car,non fuel efficient]= 
 initial private car[car]*(1-initial share of fuel efficient cars[car]) 
 ~ vehicle 
 
initial share of fuel efficient cars[car]= 
 0.39, 0.35, 0.26, 0.1, 0.13, 0.04, 0.009 
 ~ dmnl 
 
mean real disposable income per household[rural]= 
 mean real disposable income per rural household table(Time) ~~| 
mean real disposable income per household[urban]= 
 mean real disposable income per urban household table(Time) 
 ~ yuan97/household/Year 
 
mean real disposable income per rural household table( 
 [(1995,0)-(2030,60000)],(1995,7863.55),(1996,8749.56),(1997,9091.93),(1998,9
371.66), 
 (1999,9604.62),(2000,9638.7),(2001,9932.53),(2002,10425.2),(2003,10831.3),(2
004,11615.3 ),(2030.43,40702.6)) 
 ~ yuan97/household/Year 
 ~ Base 
 [(1995,0)-(2030,60000)],(1995,7863.55),(1996,8749.56),(1997,9091.93),(1998,9
371.66),(1999,9604.62),(2000,9638.7),(2001,9932.53),(2002,10425.2),(2003,10831.3
),(2004,11615.3),(2030.43,40702.6) 
  Eco1 
 [(1995,0)-(2030,60000)],(1995,7863.55),(1996,8749.56),(1997,9091.93),(1998,9
371.66),(1999,9604.62),(2000,9638.7),(2001,9932.53),(2002,10425.2),(2003,10831.3
),(2004,11615.3),(2030.43,21488.5) 
  Eco2 
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 [(1995,0)-(2030,60000)],(1995,7863.55),(1996,8749.56),(1997,9091.93),(1998,9
371.66),(1999,9604.62),(2000,9638.7),(2001,9932.53),(2002,10425.2),(2003,10831.3
),(2004,11615.3),(2030.43,57864.9) 
 
mean real disposable income per urban household table( 
 [(1995,0)-(2030,200000)],(1995,15391),(1996,15914.1),(1997,16461.4),(1998,17
281.7),(1999,18794.2),(2000,20018.6),(2001,21507.2),(2002,23876.9),(2003,25691.9
),(2004,27220.4),(2030,181034)) 
 ~ yuan97/household/Year 
 ~ Base 
 [(1995,0)-(2030,200000)],(1995,15391),(1996,15914.1),(1997,16461.4),(1998,17
281.7),(1999,18794.2),(2000,20018.6),(2001,21507.2),(2002,23876.9),(2003,25691.9
),(2004,27220.4),(2030,181034) 
  Eco1 
 [(1995,0)-(2030,200000)],(1995,15391),(1996,15914.1),(1997,16461.4),(1998,17
281.7),(1999,18794.2),(2000,20018.6),(2001,21507.2),(2002,23876.9),(2003,25691.9
),(2004,27220.4),(2030,97436.5) 
  Eco2 
 [(1995,0)-(2030,400000)],(1995,15391),(1996,15914.1),(1997,16461.4),(1998,17
281.7),(1999,18794.2),(2000,20018.6),(2001,21507.2),(2002,23876.9),(2003,25691.9
),(2004,27220.4),(2030,257566) 
 
perceived fuel economy of new car[car,efficiency]= 
 DELAY N(fuel economy of new car[car,efficiency], 0.06, initial fuel 
economy[car,efficiency], 1) 
 ~ l/km 
 
profit= 
 total revenue*average profit margin 
 ~ yuan97/Year 
 ~  ~ :SUPPLEMENTARY  
 
propensity to purchase fuel efficient car for the same price range[car,fuel efficient ]= 
 EXP(-Logit parameter*relative main cost[car,fuel efficient])/SUM(EXP(-Logit 
parameter*relative main cost[car,efficiency!])) 
 ~ dmnl 
  
reference cost= 
 1000 
 ~ yuan97/Year/vehicle 
 
reference income= 
 1 
 ~ yuan97/household/Year 
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relative fractional tech investment rate= 
 fractional tech investment rate-initial fractional investment rate 
 ~ dmnl 
 
relative fuel efficient car market share= 
 fuel efficient car market share/initial fuel efficient car market share 
 ~ dmnl 
 
relative main cost[car,efficiency]= 
 expected main cost[car,efficiency]/reference cost 
 ~ dmnl 
 
relative mean real disposable income per household[area]= 
 mean real disposable income per household[area]/reference income 
 ~ dmnl 
 
revenue[car,efficiency]= 
 actual car price[car,efficiency]*private car purchase[car,efficiency] 
 ~ yuan97/Year 
 
rural gini coefficient table( 
[(1995,0)-(2030,0.5)],(1995,0.33),(1996,0.3362),(1999,0.3539),(2001,0.3633),(2030,0
.421053)) 
 ~ dmnl 
 
rural household number table( 
[(1995,1.8e+008)-(2030,2e+008)],(1995,1.91846e+008),(1996,1.925e+008),(1997,1.9
351e+008),(1998,1.93379e+008),(1999,1.93031e+008),(2000,1.92469e+008),(2001,1
.91718e+008),(2002,1.89446e+008),(2003,1.87441e+008),(2004,1.85551e+008),(203
0,1.86429e+008)) 
 ~ household 
 
share of households below different income level[area,income class]= 
 min(1,LNNORMAL(1, income level[income class], relative mean real disposable 
income per household[area], standard deviation of household income 
 [area])) 
 ~ dmnl 
 
share of households in different income classes[area, income less than 30k]= 
 share of households below different income level[area,income 3] ~~| 
share of households in different income classes[area,income 30k to 50k]= 
 share of households below different income level[area,income 6]-share of 
households below different income level[area,income 3] ~~| 
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share of households in different income classes[area,income 60k to 100k]= 
 share of households below different income level[area,income 11]-share of 
households below different income level[area,income 6] ~~| 
share of households in different income classes[area,income 110k to 160k]= 
 share of households below different income level[area,income 17]-share of 
households below different income level[area,income 11] ~~| 
share of households in different income classes[area,income 170k to 230k]= 
 share of households below different income level[area,income 24]-share of 
households below different income level[area,income 17] ~~| 
share of households in different income classes[area,income 240k to 300k]= 
 share of households below different income level[area,income 31]-share of 
households below different income level[area,income 24] ~~| 
share of households in different income classes[area,income 310k to 500k]= 
 share of households below different income level[area,income over 50]-share of 
households below different income level[area,income 31] ~~| 
share of households in different income classes[area,income over 500k]= 
 max(0,(1-share of households below different income level[area,income over 
50])) 
 ~ dmnl 
 
standard deviation of household income[area]= 
 standard deviation over mean ratio table(gini coefficient[area])*relative mean real 
disposable income per household[area] 
 ~ dmnl 
 
standard deviation over mean ratio table( 
 [(0,0)-(0.8,6)],(0.0518,0.1),(0.109,0.2),(0.1628,0.3),(0.2133,0.4),(0.2605,0.5),(0.3
04,0.6),(0.3428,0.7),(0.3801,0.8),(0.413,0.9),(0.4429,1),(0.47,1.1),(0.5554,1.5),(0.627
,2),(0.7103,3),(0.7572,4),(0.7874,5)) 
 ~ dmnl 
 
total private car= 
 SUM(private car[car!,efficiency!]) 
 ~ vehicle 
 
total revenue= 
 SUM(revenue[car!,efficiency!]) 
 ~ yuan97/Year 
 
urban gini coefficient table( 
 [(1995,0)-(2030,0.5)],(1995.05,0.285965),(1996,0.2909),(1999,0.3155),(2001,0.3
332),(2030.11,0.403509)) 
 ~ dmnl 
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urban household number table( 
 [(1995,0)-(2030,4e+008)],(1995,1.08898e+008),(1996,1.16575e+008),(1997,1.23
665e+008),(1998,1.31671e+008),(1999,1.39325e+008),(2000,1.46665e+008),(2001,1
.55045e+008),(2002,1.65171e+008),(2003,1.74007e+008),(2004,1.82158e+008),(203
0,2.65833e+008)) 
 ~ household 
 
2.4 Cost Section 
actual car price[car,efficiency]= 
 DELAY N(SUM(indicated car price[car,efficiency,sub efficiency!])/2, 3, 
SUM(indicated car price[car,efficiency,sub efficiency!])/2, 1) 
 ~ yuan97/vehicle 
 
"actual cost per vehicle-km"= 
 total cost/"total actual vehicle-km" 
 ~ yuan97/km 
 
after shock real gasoline price before tax= 
 real gasoline price before tax*price shock 
 ~ yuan97/l 
 
annual cost[car,efficiency]= 
 annual depreciation[car,efficiency]+average road maintenance tax+gasoline 
expenditure per gasoline car[car,efficiency]+ insurance[car,efficiency]+reparis and 
maintenance cost 
 ~ yuan97/vehicle/Year 
 
annual depreciation[car,efficiency]= 
 (actual car price[car,efficiency]+registration fee[car,efficiency])/car life time 
 ~ yuan97/vehicle/Year 
 
average car price[car]= 
 40000,75000,130000,195000,265000,400000,650000 
 ~ yuan97/vehicle 
 
average road maintenance tax= 
 1500+average road maintenance tax shock 
 ~ yuan97/vehicle/Year 
 
average road maintenance tax shock= 
 STEP(-1500, 2007)*0 
 ~ yuan97/vehicle/Year 
 ~ according to http://mall.chinacars.com/list1.asp  Fee List for Driving 
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  Shanghai/ Guandong/ Beijing Road Management Administrative 
 
average vehicle kilometers[car]= 
 min("maximum vehicle-km"[car],"normal annual vehicle-km"[car]*"effect of 
gasoline price on average vehicle-km"[car]) 
 ~ km/vehicle/Year 
 
car life time= 
 10 
 ~ Year 
 ~ according to vehicle retirement standard and own estimation 
 
categorised private car[car]= 
 SUM(private car[car,efficiency!]) 
 ~ vehicle 
 
"effect of gasoline price on average vehicle-km"[car]= 
 "relative expected short-term gasoline price"^"elasticity of vehicle-km to gasoline 
price" [car] 
 ~ dmnl 
 
"elasticity of vehicle-km to gasoline price"[car]= 
 -0.4,-0.4,-0.3,-0.3,-0.2,-0.1,-0.05 
 ~ dmnl 
 ~ according to literatures: 
  1.The Long-run Structure of Traportation and Gasoline Demand 
  2.Elasticities of road Traffic and Fuel Consumption with Respect to price and 
Income: A Review 
 
"expected short-term gasoline price"=  
 DELAY N(real gasoline price after tax, "time to adjust short-term expectation", 
real gasoline price after tax, 1) 
 ~ yuan97/l 
 
fuel economy[car,efficiency]= 
 IF THEN ELSE(private car[car,efficiency]>0, fuel consumption of cars on 
road[car,efficiency]/private car[car,efficiency], initial fuel economy[car,efficiency]) 
 ~ l/km 
 
gasoline consumption[car]= 
 SUM(gasoline consumption per car[car,efficiency!]*private car[car,efficiency!]) 
 ~ l/Year 
 
gasoline consumption per car[car,efficiency]= 
Appendixes 
 81 
 average vehicle kilometers[car]*fuel economy[car,efficiency]/100 
 ~ l/vehicle/Year 
 
gasoline expenditure per gasoline car[car,efficiency]= 
 gasoline consumption per car[car,efficiency]*real gasoline price after tax 
 ~ yuan97/vehicle/Year 
 
indicated car price[car,efficiency,sub1]= 
 max(minimum car price[car],min(maximum car price[car],average car 
price[car]*(expected average fuel economy of new car[car]/expected fuel economy of 
new car[car,efficiency ]))) ~~| 
indicated car price[car,efficiency,sub2]= 
 min(maximum car price[car],max(minimum car price[car],average car 
price[car]*(expected average fuel economy of new car[car]/initial fuel 
economy[car,efficiency]))) 
 ~ yuan97/vehicle 
 
 
"initial expected short-term gasoline price"= INITIAL( 
 "expected short-term gasoline price") 
 ~ yuan97/l 
 
insurance[car,efficiency]= 
 400+actual car price[car,efficiency]*insurance rate+1300 
 ~ yuan97/vehicle/Year 
 ~ basic insurance for vehicle damage 
 
insurance rate= 
 0.012 
 ~ dmnl/Year 
 
"maximum vehicle-km"[car]= 
 40000,40000,40000,40000,40000,40000,40000 
 ~ km/vehicle/Year 
 
"normal annual vehicle-km"[car]= 
 10000,15000,15000,20000,20000,25000,25000 
 ~ km/vehicle/Year 
 ~
 http://www.che168.com/article/html/200605/20060529/20060529_131408_1.htm
l  influence of gasoline price on car purchasing 
  <1.0L      5.34L/100km   6000km-12000km/year normaly 
10000km/year 
  1.0-1.3L    5.7L/100km     8000km-15000km/year 12000km/year 
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  1.3-1.6L  6.89L/100km   10000-18000km/year    15000km/year 
taxi:60000-100000km/year main stream of private vehicle 
  1.6-2.0L   8.54L/100km     15000-60000km/year 40000km/year for 
private, government and corporate vehicle 
  2.0-2.5L  9.54L/100km  20000-50000km/year   30000km/year  luxury 
vehicles 
  >2.5L  11.37L/100km    15000-40000km/year   25000km/year super 
luxury vehicle 2% market 
  SUV    11.9L/100km    40000-70000km/year 50000km/year 
  Crossover  11.59L/100km 10000-25000km/year 
  MPV 9.99L/100km   30000-60000km/year 40000km/year 
 
private car[car,efficiency]= INTEG ( 
 private car purchase[car,efficiency]-private car scrappage[car,efficiency], 
  initial private car of different fuel efficiency[car,efficiency]) 
 ~ vehicle 
 
real gasoline price after tax= 
 after shock real gasoline price before tax*(1+tax rate) 
 
registration fee[car,efficiency]= 
 actual car price[car,efficiency]*0.1 
 ~ yuan97/vehicle 
 
"relative expected short-term gasoline price"= 
 "expected short-term gasoline price"/"initial expected short-term gasoline price" 
 ~ dmnl 
 
 
reparis and maintenance cost= 
 5500 
 ~ yuan97/vehicle/Year 
 
"standard cost per vehicle-km"= 
 total cost/"total normal vehicle-km" 
 ~ yuan97/km 
 
tax rate= 
 STEP(1, 2007)-STEP(1, 2015) 
 ~ dmnl 
 ~ 0 
  STEP(1, 2007)-STEP(1, 2015) 
 
"time to adjust short-term expectation"= 
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 1.5 
 ~ Year 
 
"total actual vehicle-km"= 
 SUM(average vehicle kilometers[car!]*categorised private car[car!]) 
 ~ km/Year 
 
total cost= 
 SUM(annual cost[car!,efficiency!]*private car[car!,efficiency!]) 
 ~ yuan97/Year 
 
total gasoline consumption= 
 SUM(gasoline consumption[car!]) 
 ~ l/Year 
 
total gasoline expenditure without tax= 
 total gasoline consumption*after shock real gasoline price before tax 
 ~ yuan97/Year 
 ~  ~ :SUPPLEMENTARY  
 
"total normal vehicle-km"= 
 SUM("normal annual vehicle-km"[car!]*categorised private car[car!]) 
 ~ km/Year 
 
total tax= 
 after shock real gasoline price before tax*tax rate*total gasoline consumption 
 ~ yuan97/Year 
 
2.5 Expectation Section 
Change in PPC[car,efficiency]= 
 (INPUT[car,efficiency] - "Perceived Present Condition 
(PPC)"[car,efficiency])/"Time to Perceive Present Condition (TPPC)" 
 ~ vehicle/Year/Year 
 ~ The perceived present condition adjusts to the actual value of the input  
  via first-order smoothing, with a time constant given by TPPC. 
 
Change in RC[car,efficiency]= 
 ("Perceived Present Condition (PPC)"[car,efficiency] - "Reference Condition 
(RC)"[car,efficiency])/"Time Horizon for Reference Condition (THRC)" 
 ~ vehicle/Year/Year 
 ~ The reference condition adjusts via first-order smoothing to the perceived 
present condition, with a time constant given by THRC, representing the historical 
horizon for trend calculation.  The longer THRC, the farther back in history the 
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decision makers consider when estimating growth rates. 
 
Change in TREND[car,efficiency]= 
 ("Indicated Trend (ITREND)" [car,efficiency]- "Perceived Trend 
(TREND)"[car,efficiency])/"Time to Perceive Trend (TPT)" 
 ~ 1/(Year*Year) 
 ~ The perceived trend adjusts via first-order smoothing to the indicated value, 
with a time constant given by TPT. 
 
expected fractional growth rate[car,efficiency]= 
 OUTPUT[car,efficiency] 
 ~ 1/Year 
 
"Indicated Trend (ITREND)"[car,efficiency]= 
 ZIDZ( ("Perceived Present Condition (PPC)" [car,efficiency]-"Reference 
Condition (RC)"[car,efficiency]), ("Reference Condition 
(RC)"[car,efficiency])*"Time Horizon for Reference Condition (THRC)") 
 ~ 1/Year 
 ~ The indicated TREND is the growth rate of the input indicated now based on 
the reference condition and the perceived present condition.  It may take time for 
decision makers to recognize and respond to this value.  The indicated trend yields 
an unbiased estimate, in steady state, of the fractional growth rate in the input. 
  ("perceived Present Condition (ppc)" [car,efficiency]-"reference Condition 
(rc)"[car,efficiency])/("reference Condition (rc)"[car,efficiency]*"TIME HORIZON 
FOR REFERENCE CONDITION (THRC)") 
 
INPUT[car,efficiency]= 
 private car purchase[car,efficiency] 
 ~ vehicle/Year 
 ~ The input to the TREND function.  Set for testing purposes to an 
exponential. 
 
OUTPUT[car,efficiency]= 
 "Perceived Trend (TREND)"[car,efficiency] 
 ~ 1/Year 
 ~ The output of the TREND function is simply the perceived trend. 
 
"Perceived Present Condition (PPC)"[car,efficiency]= INTEG ( 
 Change in PPC[car,efficiency],INPUT[car,efficiency]/(1+"Perceived Trend 
(TREND)"[car,efficiency]*"Time to Perceive Present Condition (TPPC)" )) 
 ~ vehicle/Year 
 ~ The perceived present condition of the input lags behind the true input to 
capture data reporting and perception delays.  Set initially in the steady state given 
the user-supplied initial value of the perceived trend. 
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"Perceived Trend (TREND)"[car,efficiency]= INTEG ( 
 Change in TREND[car,efficiency],0) 
 ~ 1/Year 
 ~ The Perceived TREND is the decision makers' belief about the current \ 
  fractional rate of change in the input. 
 
private car purchase[car,fuel efficient]= 
 (max(0,(desired car for different price classification[car]-SUM(private 
car[car,efficiency!])))/adjustment time+SUM(private car 
scrappage[car,efficiency!]))*propensity to purchase fuel efficient car for the same 
price range[car,fuel efficient] ~~| 
private car purchase[car,non fuel efficient]= 
 (max(0,(desired car for different price classification[car]-SUM(private 
car[car,efficiency!])))/adjustment time+SUM(private car 
scrappage[car,efficiency!]))*(1-propensity to purchase fuel efficient car for the same 
price range[car,fuel efficient]) 
 ~ vehicle/Year 
 
"Reference Condition (RC)"[car,efficiency]= INTEG ( 
 Change in RC[car,efficiency], 
  "Perceived Present Condition (PPC)"[car,efficiency]/(1+"Perceived Trend 
(TREND)"[car ,efficiency]*"Time Horizon for Reference Condition (THRC)")) 
 ~ vehicle/Year 
 ~ The reference condition is an exponentially weighted average of the past 
values of the perceived present condition.  It represents the value of the input THRC 
periods in the past.  Set initially in the steady state given the user-supplied initial 
value of the perceived trend. 
 
"Time Horizon for Reference Condition (THRC)"= 
 1 
 ~ Year 
 ~ The long the time horizon, the more short-term variation in the growth rate of 
the input will be filtered out by the TREND function. 
 
"Time to Perceive Present Condition (TPPC)"= 
 0.25 
 ~ Year 
 ~ The average lag in the reporting and perception of the input. 
 
"Time to Perceive Trend (TPT)"= 
 0.25 
 ~ Year 
 ~ The time required for decision makers to adjust their beliefs and reports to 
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the indicated trend.  Represents report preparation and perception delays in the 
adjustment of growth expectations to new information. 
 
2.6 Fuel Economy Section 
annual transition cost= 
 product line transition cost/product life time 
 ~ yuan97/Year 
 
average fuel economy= 
 SUM(fuel economy[car!,efficiency!]*private car[car!,efficiency!])/SUM(private 
car[car!,efficiency!]) 
 ~ l/km 
 ~  ~ :SUPPLEMENTARY  
 
average fuel economy of new car[car]= 
 SUM(fuel economy of new car[car,efficiency!])/2 
 ~ l/km 
 
average profit margin= 
 initial average profit margin-relative fractional tech investment rate 
 ~ dmnl 
 
desired fuel economy= 
 initial desired fuel economy*"relative expected long-term gasoline 
price"^elasticity of fuel economy to gasoline price 
 ~ dmnl 
 
elasticity of fuel economy to gasoline price= 
 -0.3 
 ~ dmnl 
 
expected average fuel economy of new car[car]=  
 DELAY N(average fuel economy of new car[car], 3, SUM(initial fuel 
economy[car,efficiency!])/2, 1) 
 ~ l/km 
 
expected demand[car,efficiency]= 
 private car purchase[car,efficiency]*(1+expected fractional growth 
rate[car,efficiency]*reference time)^(time to apply tech on product line/reference 
time) 
 ~ vehicle/Year 
 
expected fuel economy of new car[car,efficiency]= 
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 initial fuel economy[car,efficiency]*max(desired fuel economy,relative fuel 
economy of prototype ) 
 ~ l/km 
 
"expected long-term gasoline price"=  
 DELAY N(real gasoline price after tax, "time to adjust long-term expectation", 
real gasoline price after tax, 1) 
 ~ yuan97/l 
 
fuel consumption discard on road[car,efficiency]= 
 fuel economy[car,efficiency]*private car scrappage[car,efficiency] 
 ~ l*vehicle/(Year*km) 
 
fuel consumption improvement of new car= 
 (max(relative fuel economy of prototype,desired fuel economy)-relative fuel 
economy of new car)/time to apply tech on product line 
 ~ dmnl/Year 
 
fuel consumption improvement on road[car,efficiency]= 
 fuel economy of new car[car,efficiency]*private car purchase[car,efficiency] 
 ~ (l/km)*(vehicle/Year) 
 
fuel consumption of cars on road[car,efficiency]= INTEG ( 
 fuel consumption improvement on road[car,efficiency]-fuel consumption discard 
on road[car,efficiency], 
  initial fuel economy[car,efficiency]*private car[car,efficiency]) 
 ~ l*vehicle/km 
 
fuel economy of new car[car,efficiency]= 
 initial fuel economy[car,efficiency]*relative fuel economy of new 
car*willingness to change fuel economy[car,efficiency,sub1]+initial fuel 
economy[car,efficiency]*(1-willingness to change fuel economy[car,efficiency,sub1]) 
 ~ l/km 
 
 
indicated profit[car,efficiency,sub1]= 
 indicated revenue[car,efficiency,sub1]-annual transition cost-production cost per 
car [car]*expected demand[car,efficiency] ~~| 
indicated profit[car,efficiency,sub2]= 
 indicated revenue[car,efficiency,sub2]-production cost per car[car]*expected 
demand[car,efficiency] 
 ~ yuan97/Year 
 
indicated relative fuel consumption= 
Appendixes 
 88 
 relative tech cost table(tech investment allocation/initial cost for new prototype) 
 ~ dmnl 
 
 
indicated revenue[car,efficiency,sub efficiency]= 
 indicated car price[car,efficiency,sub efficiency]*expected demand[car,efficiency] 
 ~ yuan97/Year 
 
initial average profit margin= 
 0.06 
 ~ dmnl 
 
initial cost for new prototype= 
 8e+009 
 ~ yuan97 
 
initial desired fuel economy= 
 1 
 ~ dmnl 
 
"initial expected long-term gasoline price"= INITIAL( 
 "expected long-term gasoline price") 
 ~ yuan97/l 
 
initial fuel economy[car,fuel efficient]= 
 7.29,9.03,10.02,11.538,11.538,12.8,13.325 ~~| 
initial fuel economy[car,non fuel efficient]= 
 9.945,11.16,11.88,14.76,13.275,14.93,15.21 
 ~ l/km 
 ~ China industrial statistics yearbook 
 
Logit parameter= 
 0.5 
 ~ dmnl 
 
maximum car price[car]= 
 60000,120000,190000,270000,360000,600000,800000 
 ~ yuan97/vehicle 
 ~ 50000,100000,160000,230000,300000,500000,1e+006 
 
minimum car price[car]= 
 30000,50000,90000,140000,200000,280000,450000 
 ~ yuan97/vehicle 
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price shock= 
 1+STEP(1,2015) 
 ~ dmnl 
 ~ 1 
  1+STEP(1,2015) 
 
private car scrappage[car,efficiency]= 
 private car[car,efficiency]/car life time 
 ~ vehicle/Year 
 
product life time= 
 3 
 ~ Year 
 
product line transition cost= 
 1e+008 
 ~ yuan97 
 ~ retrofit or substitution 
 
production cost per car[car]= 
 average car price[car]*(1-average profit margin) 
 ~ yuan97/vehicle 
 
real gasoline price before tax= WITH LOOKUP ( 
 Time, 
 ([(1995,0)-(2030,10)],(1995,2.44759),(1996,2.33873),(1997,2.33873),(1998,2.33
873),(1999,2.43342),(2000,3.03492),(2001,2.92295),(2002,2.87544),(2003,3.16346),(
2004,3.45147),(2005,3.8),(2006,4.7) )) 
 ~ yuan97/l 
 
reference profit= 
 1e+010 
 ~ yuan97/Year 
 
reference time= 
 1 
 ~ Year 
 
"relative expected long-term gasoline price"= 
 "expected long-term gasoline price"/"initial expected long-term gasoline price" 
 ~ dmnl 
 
relative fuel economy of new car= INTEG ( 
 fuel consumption improvement of new car,1) 
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 ~ dmnl 
 
relative fuel economy of prototype= INTEG ( 
 tech improvement,1) 
 ~ dmnl 
 
relative profit[car,efficiency,sub efficiency]= 
 indicated profit[car,efficiency,sub efficiency]/reference profit 
 ~ dmnl 
 
relative tech cost table( 
 [(0,0)-(40,1)],(0.336391,0.97807),(0.489297,0.97807),(0.678899,0.969298),(0.83
1804,0.95614),(0.978593,0.929825),(1.59021,0.877193),(2.93578,0.745614),(5.9938
8,0.587719),(8.31804,0.52193),(12.1101,0.45614),(16.1468,0.416667),(21.2844,0.36
8421),(26.422,0.342105),(30.0917,0.324561),(34.3731,0.311404),(38.2875,0.311404)
) 
 ~ dmnl 
 ~
 [(0,0)-(40,1)],(0.336391,0.97807),(0.489297,0.97807),(0.678899,0.969298),(0.83
1804,0.95614),(0.978593,0.929825),(1.59021,0.877193),(2.93578,0.745614),(5.9938
8,0.587719),(8.31804,0.52193),(12.1101,0.45614),(16.1468,0.416667),(21.2844,0.36
8421),(26.422,0.342105),(30.0917,0.324561),(34.3731,0.311404),(38.2875,0.311404) 
  Tc1 
 [(0,0)-(40,1)],(0.336391,0.97807),(0.489297,0.97807),(0.678899,0.969298),(0.83
1804,0.95614),(0.978593,0.947368),(2.56881,0.877193),(4.64832,0.780702),(7.9510
7,0.662281),(10.6422,0.583333),(13.4557,0.513158),(17.1254,0.464912),(21.1621,0.
421053),(26.422,0.385965),(30.2141,0.368421),(34.4954,0.355263),(38.2875,0.3377
19) 
  Tc2 
 [(0,0)-(40,1)],(0.336391,0.97807),(0.489297,0.97807),(0.678899,0.969298),(0.83
1804,0.95614),(0.831804,0.934211),(0.978593,0.877193),(1.83486,0.732456),(4.892
97,0.565789),(7.5841,0.486842),(11.9878,0.407895),(15.9021,0.350877),(21.2844,0.
302632),(26.422,0.27193),(30.2141,0.236842),(34.2508,0.22807),(38.4098,0.210526) 
 
tech improvement= 
 (indicated relative fuel consumption-relative fuel economy of prototype)/time to 
develop tech 
 ~ dmnl/Year 
 
tech investment allocation=  
 DELAY N(technology investment rate, time to allocate tech investment, 
technology investment rate, 2) 
 ~ yuan97/Year 
 ~ DELAY N(technology investment rate, TIME TO ALLOCATE TECH 
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INVESTMENT, technology investment rate, 2) 
   
  DELAY N(technology investment rate+total tax/2, TIME TO ALLOCATE 
TECH INVESTMENT, technology investment rate+total tax/2, 2) 
 
technology investment rate= 
 total revenue*fractional tech investment rate 
 ~ yuan97/Year 
 
"time to adjust long-term expectation"= 
 3 
 ~ Year 
 
time to allocate tech investment= 
 2 
 ~ Year 
 
time to apply tech on product line= 
 3 
 ~ Year 
 ~ 3 
  Winning the oil endgame p170 
 
time to develop tech= 
 5 
 ~ Year 
 
willingness to change fuel economy[car,efficiency,sub1]= 
 EXP(Logit parameter*relative profit[car,efficiency,sub1])/SUM(EXP(Logit 
parameter*relative profit[car,efficiency,sub efficiency!])) 
 ~ dmnl 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
